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THE ACTIVIST SHAREHOLDERS’ MIGRATION TO
EUROPE: HOW THE UNITED STATES CAN
RETAIN ITS WANDERING INVESTORS
INTRODUCTION
On August 13, 2013, activist investor Carl Icahn tweeted, “We cur-
rently have a large position in APPLE.  We believe the company to be
extremely undervalued.”1  Apple’s market value increased by $17 bil-
lion within hours because of Icahn’s tweet composed of less than 140
characters.2  Less than two months later, Icahn again disclosed over
Twitter that he was discussing the possibility of a $150 billion share
buyback plan with the CEO of Apple.3  Apple’s market capitalization
then increased by $1 billion, causing the overall value of the company
to reach $443 billion.4  For reasons such as this, “[s]hareholders should
be tickled to death when [Carl Icahn] shows up.”5
Icahn, as well as other activist shareholders, look for publicly traded
corporations that may be poorly managed or undervalued and then
use their rights as shareholders to push for changes in the corpora-
tions.6  Examples of these changes include higher dividend payments,
share buybacks, cost cuts, and changes in management.7  While ac-
tivist shareholders have often been scrutinized, the fact that their cam-
paigns have provided significant benefits to corporations and their
shareholders is undeniable.8  For example, the stocks of corporations
that were targeted by activists between 2009 and 2013 rose nearly
1.  Carl Icahn (@Carl_C_Icahn), TWITTER (Aug. 13, 2013, 11:21 AM), https://twitter.com/
carl_c_icahn/status/367350206993399808.
2. David Carr, Using Twitter to Move the Markets, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 6, 2013), http://www
.nytimes.com/2013/10/07/business/media/using-twitter-to-move-the-markets.html?ref=global-
home&_r=0.
3. Carl Icahn (@Carl_C_Icahn), TWITTER (Oct. 1, 2013, 7:23 AM), https://twitter.com/carl_c_
icahn/status/385047418284158976.
4. Carr, supra note 2. R
5. Stephen Foley, Carl Icahn, Obsessive Activist Investor, FIN. TIMES (Feb. 21, 2014, 6:44 PM),
http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/d4d05c84-9a54-11e3-8232-00144feab7de.html#axzz3z7pfn0RZ.
6. Tara Lachapelle & Beth Jinks, Predators Are Good for Stocks, BLOOMBERG (Apr. 4, 2014,
1:19 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/bw/articles/2014-04-03/activist-investors-are-good-for-the-
stock-price.
7. See id.; see also Alexandra Stevenson, No Barbarians at the Gate; Instead, a Force for
Change, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 6, 2014, 6:42 PM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2014/01/06/no-barbari-
ans-at-the-gate-instead-a-force-for-change/?_r=0.
8. Stevenson, supra note 7. R
605
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forty-eight percent by the end of that period.9  Activists may have just
hit the tip of the iceberg in terms of their potential in America, but as
of late, they have begun to launch more campaigns abroad than ever
before.10  In 2015 alone, 131 companies outside of the United States
were targeted, which is a forty-seven percent increase from the previ-
ous year.11  Numerous reasons have driven this move abroad, but a
leading factor is the shareholder friendly corporate governance law
found overseas.12
This Comment argues that the corporate governance system of the
United States should be altered to reflect certain shareholder friendly
policies that are embodied in the United Kingdom.  Strict, mandatory
regulations currently govern the United States, so the adoption of the
shareholder friendly policies similar to Principles 5 and 6 of the UK
Stewardship Code13 and Section E of the UK Corporate Governance
Code14 would be beneficial to American activists.  The already ex-
isting strict regulations would allow for investors to obtain all of the
information they need in order to make respectable investments.  The
adoption of UK shareholder-friendly policies, in addition to the ex-
isting U.S. rules, would allow activist investors and other shareholders
to work together to enact crucial changes in corporations more easily.
By combining these policies, American activists would not feel the
need to travel abroad to find more shareholder friendly laws.  This
Comment contends that the implementation would trigger a domino
effect in the American market.  The increase of shareholder friendly
policies would allow shareholders to reap more benefits, thereby al-
lowing corporations to maximize their profits as well.  Overall, the in-
corporation of parts of the UK Codes into the American system
would help activist shareholders generate even more beneficial
changes in corporate America.
Part II of this Comment first explores the work of activist share-
holders and the controversy behind their campaigns.15  It then moves
to identify some of the many benefits that activists can, and have, of-
9. Lachapelle & Jinks, supra note 6. R
10. Michael Flaherty & Sinead Cruise, Shareholder Activism Grows Overseas as US Market
Gets Crowded, REUTERS (Aug. 31, 2015), http://www.reuters.com/article/funds-activists-over-
seas-idUSL4N11342X20150831.
11. Id.; see also Billy Bambrough, The Revolution Will Be Monetised: Activist Investors Are
Closing in on a Record Year, CITY A.M. (Nov. 5, 2015, 12:02 AM), http://www.cityam.com/
228048/the-revolution-will-be-monetised-activist-investors-are-closing-in-on-a-record-year (“In-
cidents of shareholders pushing for change in Europe have risen 126 per cent since 2010.”).
12. See Flaherty & Cruise, supra note 10. R
13. UK STEWARDSHIP CODE (FIN. REPORTING COUNCIL 2012).
14. UK CORP. GOVERNANCE CODE (FIN. REPORTING COUNCIL 2016).
15. See infra notes 20–35 and accompanying text. R
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fered to corporations.16  Lastly, Part II explores the general corporate
governance laws in both the United States and the United Kingdom.17
Part III argues that certain aspects of the UK Corporate Governance
Code and the UK Stewardship Code should be implemented into the
United States corporate governance regime.18  Part IV examines the
impact that the implementation of these laws would have in the
United States,19 and Part V concludes that shareholders and corpora-
tions alike would benefit greatly from a merged legal system com-
posed of both U.S. and UK policies.
II. BACKGROUND
This Part describes the role of activist shareholders and the contro-
versy surrounding their work.  This Part then discusses the dissimilar
versions of corporate governance laws found in the U.S. and the UK
that affect activist shareholders.
A. The Controversial Activist Shareholder
Shareholder activism involves attempts to bring about changes in
corporations that are not currently pursuing “shareholder-wealth-
maximizing goals.”20  While there are numerous situations in which
activist shareholders have been beneficial to corporations, reaching
these goals can be a difficult task that requires activists to take actions
that executives and the board of directors oppose.21  For this reason,
activists’ poor reputation as “corporate raiders” has been somewhat
difficult to shake.22  Since their emergence, many have viewed activ-
ists as a “cult of short-term shareholder[s]” that only aim to strip cor-
porations for cash and assets.23  During the 1980s, in a time referred to
16. See infra notes 36–70 and accompanying text. R
17. See infra notes 71–150 and accompanying text. R
18. See infra notes 151–296 and accompanying text. R
19. See infra notes 297–339 and accompanying text. R
20. Michael P. Smith, Shareholder Activism by Institutional Investors: Evidence from
CalPERS, 51 J. FIN. 227, 227 (1996).
21. James Kwak, Markets Aren’t that Stupid, BASELINE SCENARIO (Aug. 12, 2013), http://base-
linescenario.com/2013/08/12/markets-arent-that-stupid/ (“Entrenched CEOs and boards (and
their lawyers) don’t like this because, well, they don’t like outsiders telling them what to do and
stirring up shareholders to vote against them.”).
22. Stevenson, supra note 7 (“Once painted as greedy corporate raiders, they would amass R
large stakes in a company and, through brute force, push for changes in the company’s leader-
ship and business practices.”).
23. Capitalism’s Unlikely Heroes: Why Activist Investors Are Good for the Public Company,
ECONOMIST (Feb. 5, 2015, 11:57 AM), http://www.economist.com/news/leaders/21642169-why-ac-
tivist-investors-are-good-public-company-capitalisms-unlikely-heroes; see also CAROLYN KAY
BRANCATO, INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: BEST PRACTICES FOR
INCREASING CORPORATE VALUE 29 (1997).
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as the “takeover wars,” activists had numerous resources at their dis-
posal, which enabled them to be highly aggressive and self-interested
while focusing primarily on short-term financial gains.24  For example,
investors engaged in “Saturday night special” raids, in which they
would attempt to take over corporations via cash tender offers.25
During these raids, investors would buy a majority of stock over the
weekend, which in turn led to an almost inevitable takeover.26  How-
ever, activists’ methods and goals have changed over time.27
Although raids of this kind no longer exist, many continue to chal-
lenge activist shareholders and their campaigns, refusing to forget the
“corporate raider” nickname.28  The opponents of shareholder activ-
ism, ranging from prominent authors and professors to business orga-
nizations and corporate lawyers, have continued to voice their
objections to these campaigns over the years.29  The primary argu-
ment opponents have championed against activism has been dubbed
the “myopic-activists” claim.30  Under this claim, “activist sharehold-
ers with short investment horizons . . . push for actions that are profit-
able in the short term but are detrimental to the long-term interests of
companies and their long-term shareholders.”31  The law firm
Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz has launched numerous attacks on
24. BRANCATO, supra note 23, at 95; see Margaret Isa, Where, Oh Where, Have All the Corpo- R
rate Raiders Gone?, N.Y. TIMES (June 30, 1996), http://www.nytimes.com/1996/06/30/business/
where-oh-where-have-all-the-corporate-raiders-gone.html.
25. BRANCATO, supra note 23, at 96. R
26. Steven M. Davidoff, The SEC and the Failure of Federal Takeover Regulation, 34 FLA. ST.
U. L. REV. 211, 216 (2007) (“The ‘Saturday Night Special’ was a favorite: in one form, a bidder
would embark on a pre-offer buying raid to establish a substantial beachhead of ownership at a
reduced price.”).  Raiders took advantage of shareholders and provided them little time and
little information before they could decide whether to sell or surrender their shares. See Andrew
N. Nagel et al., The Williams Act: A Truly “Modern” Assessment, HARV. L. SCH. F. CORP. GOV-
ERNANCE & FIN. REG. (Oct. 22, 2011), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2011/10/22/the-williams-
act-a-truly-modern-assessment/.
27. Since the passage of the Williams Act of 1968, corporate management has been armed
with weapons to oppose takeovers, such as poison pills and staggered board terms. See Nagel et
al., supra note 26, at 1–2, 7. R
28. Dunstan Prial, Long-Term Reformers or Corporate Raiders: Today’s Activist Investors,
FOX BUS. (June 1, 2015), http://www.foxbusiness.com/features/2015/05/29/long-term-reformers-
or-corporate-raiders-today-activist-investors.html (“Are they the corporate raiders of 1980s in-
famy . . . [o]r are they thoughtful corporate strategists . . . ?  Perhaps these activists are a little bit
of both.”).
29. Lucian A. Bebchuk et al., The Long-Term Effects of Hedge Fund Activism, 115 COLUM. L.
REV. 1085, 1093–94 (2015).
30. Id. at 1087; see also Dionysia Katelouzou, Myths and Realities of Hedge Fund Activism:
Some Empirical Evidence, 7 VA. L. & BUS. REV. 459, 477 (2013).
31. Bebchuk et al., The Long-Term Effects, supra note 29, at 1087. R
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activists using this logic.32  Martin Lipton, a founding partner, has
been at the head of many of the attacks.33  Lipton argues that studies
portraying activist campaigns as beneficial are incorrect, as they do
not take into account how campaigns often push for short-term steps
at the expense of the corporations’ long-term goals.34  However, this
argument does not go unopposed.  For example, many proponents of
activist campaigns argue that the myopic-activists claim fails because
“a company’s stock price at any moment incorporates market expecta-
tions about how it will perform for the rest of time, so it is already a
long-term measure.”35  For this reason, it is impossible for an activist
to only have short-term goals, as even short-term goals will ultimately
affect a corporation in the future.  To illustrate, the following Section
describes some of the long-term benefits that activists can provide to a
corporation and its shareholders.
B. The Benefit of Activist Campaigns to Corporations
A change in the activists’ agenda over the last two decades has in-
creasingly led more people to drop the “corporate raider” name.36  In-
stead, activists are now more commonly associated with increasing
shareholder value.37  Activists’ goals are now different, as they no
longer solely want to take control of a corporation in which they own
shares, but instead seek to bring about operational, strategic, and gov-
ernance changes that are beneficial to, and will create value for, share-
holders.38  Benefits arise when, for example, activists seek to return
excess cash to shareholders, to restructure company assets by selling
underachieving businesses and distributing the proceeds to sharehold-
ers, and to restructure corporate operations to generate greater prof-
its.39  Activists’ methods of achieving their goals have also changed.40
32. Liz Hoffman, Wachtell Launches Another Grenade in Activist Debate, LAW360 (Aug. 26,
2013, 2:56 PM), http://www.law360.com/articles/467671/wachtell-lobs-another-grenade-in-ac-
tivist-debate.
33. Id.
34. See Lachapelle & Jinks, supra note 6. See generally Martin Lipton, Bite the Apple; Poison R
the Apple; Paralyze the Company; Wreck the Economy, HARV. L. SCH. F. CORP. GOVERNANCE
& FIN. REG. (Feb. 26, 2013), http://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2013/02/26/bite-the-apple-poison-
the-apple-paralyze-the-company-wreck-the-economy/.
35. Kwak, supra note 21. R
36. Isa, supra note 24. R
37. See Katelouzou, supra note 30, at 461–62; see also Charles Nathan, Debunking Myths R
About Activist Investors, HARV. L. SCH. F. CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (Mar. 15, 2013),
http://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2013/03/15/debunking-myths-about-activist-investors/ (“Activist
investing is often a useful contributor to good corporate governance and a force for company
implementation of strategies that enhance shareholder value.”).
38. See Nagel et al., supra note 26, at 2. R
39. Nathan, supra note 37. R
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Instead of using secretive tender offers, such as the “Saturday night
specials,” activists gain only enough control to influence both share-
holders and management to adopt their ideas for change.41  While cor-
porate raiders of the past purchased large masses of shares in order to
obtain operational control, activist shareholders now only acquire
enough shares to allow their voices to be heard.42
In response to Martin Lipton’s contention that activists do not lead
to corporate improvement, Carl Icahn stated, “Marty Lipton is com-
pletely wrong.  He’s been wrong for 30 years.”43  Icahn supported this
claim with evidence of numerous successful activist campaigns.44  As
minority shareholders, many activist shareholders have brought forth
substantial and positive changes in corporate America.  For example,
in 2014, Jeff Smith of Starboard Value LP launched a campaign
against Darden Restaurants, Inc. while owning less than ten percent
of the company.45  The campaign primarily focused on the fact that
Darden had ignored shareholder recommendations and concerns by
selling Red Lobster, and it also included a 300-page list of recommen-
dations for improving the business.46  The successful campaign re-
sulted in replacing every member of Darden’s board of directors with
individuals picked by Starboard Value LP.47  James Mitarotonda,
chairman and CEO of the activist investor group Barington Capital
Group, stated that he was “extremely pleased that necessary changes
have been made to Darden’s board and senior management team to
pave the way for the implementation of new measures to enhance
40. Id.
41. Nagel et al., supra note 26, at 8; see also Stephen Foley et al., Activist Investors Learn to R
Mind Their Manners, FIN. TIMES (Aug. 7, 2015, 7:26 PM), http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/209f07
00-3ce3-11e5-8613-07d16aad2152.html#axzz42AbZni1d (“Many US activists now couch their de-
mands as asking boards to ‘consider’ spin offs and to appoint ‘independent’ directors—rather
than the activist himself—to the board.  This sits well with other shareholders . . . .”).
42. See Nagel et al., supra note 26, at 16–17; see also Nathan, supra note 37 (“Today, activist R
investors rarely seek equity stakes in target companies above 10%, and their financing comes not
from the public debt or equity markets but rather through private hedge funds that they sponsor
and manage.”).
43. Lachapelle & Jinks, supra note 6. R
44. See infra notes 45–55 and accompanying text. R
45. William D. Cohan, Starboard Value’s Jeff Smith: The Investor CEOs Fear Most, FORTUNE
(Dec. 3, 2014, 7:40 PM), http://fortune.com/2014/12/03/starboard-capitals-jeff-smith-activist-in-
vestor-darden-restaurants/.
46. Alexandra Stevenson, Activist Hedge Fund Starboard Succeeds in Replacing Darden
Board, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 10, 2014, 10:42 AM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2014/10/10/activist-
hedge-fund-starboard-succeeds-in-replacing-darden-board/.
47. Id.
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shareholder value.”48  The new board made strides in attempting to
increase shareholder value while also approving a transaction that re-
duced Darden’s debt by approximately $1 billion.49  In another exam-
ple, when Apple planned to have its shareholders vote on a proposal
that would make it harder for the company to issue preferred shares,50
David Einhorn of Greenlight Capital launched a campaign that forced
Apple to return part of its $137 billion cash reserve to shareholders
through buybacks and dividend payments.51  Furthermore, Bill Ack-
man of Pershing Square Capital Management used his campaign to
break up Fortune Brands into two publicly traded companies in order
to unlock value for shareholders.52  Beam, one of the companies For-
tune broke into, has a stock price that has climbed nearly twenty-four
percent since it became independent53 and was acquired for over $13
billion.54  Lastly, Daniel Loeb not only ousted Yahoo’s CEO, who had
falsely claimed that he had a computer science degree, but also in-
creased Yahoo’s stock price from approximately $13 per share to
$29.11 per share as of 2013.55
Beyond these specific examples, empirical evidence also supports
that there are benefits to activist participation.  In response to myopic-
activist claims, discussed above, that capital markets are often ineffi-
cient and that activists often have only short-term investment hori-
zons,56 Lucian A. Bebchuk,57 Alon Brav,58 and Wei Jiang59 published
48. Leslie Patton, Starboard Wins All Seats on Darden’s Board, BLOOMBERG (Oct. 10, 2014,
3:19 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2014-10-10/starboard-wins-all-12-seats-on-
darden-s-board-after-proxy-fight.
49. Darden Announces Record and Distribution Dates for Spin-Off of Four Corners Property
Trust, Inc., PR NEWSWIRE (Oct. 21, 2015), http://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/darden-an-
nounces-record-and-distribution-dates-for-spin-off-of-four-corners-property-trust-inc-300164034
.html.
50. M.G., Apple and Greenlight Capital: Einhorn, 1, Apple 0, ECONOMIST (Feb. 22, 2013, 10:51
PM), http://www.economist.com/blogs/schumpeter/2013/02/apple-and-greenlight-capital.
51. Id.
52. Michael J. de la Merced, Fortune Brands Plans a Three-Way Split, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 7,
2010, 9:39 PM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2010/12/07/fortune-brands-to-split-up/.
53. Michael J. de la Merced, Thank Ackman for the Beam Deal, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 13, 2014,
8:02 AM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2014/01/13/thank-bill-ackman-for-the-beam-deal/.
54. Michael J. de la Merced & David Gelles, My Old Osaka Home: Suntory of Japan to Buy
Maker of Jim Beam, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 13, 2014, 7:20 AM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2014/01/
13/suntory-of-japan-to-buy-maker-of-jim-beam-for-13-6-billion/.
55. Nathan Vardi, Billionaire Dan Loeb Sells Most of His Yahoo Stock, Makes $1 Billion,
FORBES (Jul. 22, 2013, 10:22 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/nathanvardi/2013/07/22/billion-
aire-dan-loeb-sells-most-of-his-yahoo-stock-makes-1-billion/.
56. Bebchuk et al., The Long-Term Effects, supra note 29, at 1087; Katelouzou, supra note 30, R
at 477.
57. James Barr Ames Professor of Law, Economics, and Finance; Director, Program on Cor-
porate Governance, Harvard Law School.
58. Alon Brav Robert L. Dickens Professor, Duke University, Furqua School of Business.
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a study concluding that these accusations are invalid.60  The study
used objective data, as opposed to many other studies that use self-
reported impressions of activists and their campaigns.61  Bebchuk,
Brav, and Jiang analyzed approximately two thousand activist cam-
paigns that occurred between 1994 and 2007, and they found no evi-
dence that activist interventions are followed by short-term gains that
come at the expense of long-term performance, as many opponents
argue.62  According to the study’s findings, in the five years after ac-
tivist intervention, corporations’ valuations improved and sharehold-
ers continued to benefit from positive returns.63  In furtherance of this
study, Activist Insight cited that activist-targeted stocks outperform
the S&P 500 by an average of 4.3% upon the activists’ departure.64
The price per share of Surmodics, Inc., for example, increased 119.1%
within the twenty-two months after Starboard Value launched its cam-
paign.65  Seven months after Starboard’s exit, the share price of this
small healthcare corporation rose an additional 29.4%, permitting it to
beat the S&P 50066 by 18.5 percentage points.67  Additionally, when
JANA Partners pushed for a spin-off at Marathon Petroleum in 2011,
Marathon shareholders enjoyed a 72% increase in share price in the
fifteen months after the activists’ departure.68  Here, Marathon out-
performed the S&P 500 by 53 percentage points.69
Data such as this has been used to convert the skeptics of activist
campaigns to supporters.  In fact, Lipton, a known opponent of ac-
59. Arthur F. Burns Professor of Free and Competitive Enterprise, Columbia Business
School.
60. Bebchuk et al., The Long-Term Effects, supra note 29, at 1096. R
61. Id. at 1097 (“Martin Lipton, for example, wrote that his short-termism concerns are based
on ‘the decades of [his] firm’s experience in advising corporations.’ . . . Wachtell Lipton urged
reliance on the ‘depth of real-world experience’ of corporate leaders rather than on empirical
evidence.”).
62. Id. at 1100, 1155.
63. Id. at 1111, 1134.
64. Press Release, Activist Insight, Activists Leaving Companies in Good Shape (May 9,
2013), http://www.activistinsight.com/press/Activist%20Insight%20Press%20Release%20-
%20good%20shape.pdf.
65. Id.
66. “The S&P 500 stands for the Standard and Poor 500.  It is a stock market index that tracks
the 500 most widely held stocks on the New York Stock Exchange or NASDAQ.  It seeks to
represent the entire stock market by reflecting the risk and return of all large cap companies.”
Kimberly Amadeo, What Does the S&P 500 Tell You About Stocks?, BALANCE (Oct. 17, 2016),
https://www.thebalance.com/what-is-the-sandp-500-3305888.  An investor beats the S&P 500
when the investment has a greater return that the S&P index.  Amy Fontinelle, Is It Possible to
Beat the Market?, INVESTOPEDIA, http://www.investopedia.com/ask/answers/12/beating-the-mar-
ket.asp (last visited Mar. 23, 2017).
67. Press Release, Activist Insight, supra note 64. R
68. Id.
69. Id.
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tivist campaigns, wrote a letter in which he stated that activists “have
become respected members of the financial community . . . In most
cases a corporation will be well advised to meet with the activist and
discuss the activist’s criticisms and proposals.”70  Although activists
continue to be seen in a more favorable light, the corporate govern-
ance structure of the United States is still restricting their ability to
work and generate changes in corporate America.  The next Section
describes the governance regime in which the activists work.
C. Corporate Governance in the United States
Corporate governance is generally defined as a “set of control
mechanisms and institutions which protect the suppliers of capital to a
company.”71  Although the definition of corporate governance shifts
depending on the party, most agree that corporate governance is a
means to benefit shareholders and increase their value.72  While there
is not one specific governing law, state law, in addition to the Securi-
ties Exchange Act of 1934,73 the Sarbanes–Oxley Act of 2002
(SOX),74 and the guidelines set forth in stock exchanges, such as the
National Association of Securities Dealers Automated Quotations
(NASDAQ) and the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE), are of im-
portance to corporate governance in the United States.75
70. Martin Lipton, Some Lesson from DuPont-Trian, HARV. L. SCH. F. CORP. GOVERNANCE
& FIN. REG. (Apr. 30, 2015), http://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2015/04/30/some-lessons-from-du-
pont-trian/; see Kurt Orzeck, Wachtell Lipton Funder Suggests Settling with Activists, LAW360
(Apr. 30, 2015, 8:51 PM), http://www.law360.com/articles/650253/wachtell-lipton-founder-sug-
gests-settling-with-activists (“Lipton appeared to have changed, or at least softened, his position.
He said corporations—even ones with ‘outstanding’ CEOs and boards of directors—would be
well-advised to meet with activists and discuss their criticisms and proposals.”).
71. Shareholders are the suppliers of capital. GEOFFREY OWEN ET AL., CORPORATE GOVERN-
ANCE IN THE US AND EUROPE: WHERE ARE WE NOW? 2 (2006); see also PETER ALEXIS
GOUREVITCH & JAMES J. SHINN, POLITICAL POWER AND CORPORATE CONTROL: THE NEW
GLOBAL POLITICS OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 3 (2005) (“These laws define the obligations of
managers, the rights and duties of owners, the claims of shareholders, and the power of
boards.”).
72. Abdul Ghafoor Awan & Muhammad Saeed Akhtar, Problems of Corporate Governance
in USA, EUR. J. BUS. & INNOVATION RES., Aug. 2014, at 55, 56.
73. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a–78qq (2012).
74. Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (2002).
75. See Corporate Governance: USA Versus Europe, VALUEWALK (Jan. 7, 2013, 12:34 PM),
http://www.valuewalk.com/2013/01/corporate-governance-usa-versus-europe; see also Adam
Dowdney, Corporate Governance in The UK and U.S. Comparison, METRO. CORP. COUNS.
(Dec. 1, 2005), http://www.metrocorpcounsel.com/articles/6173/corporate-governance-uk-and-us-
comparison.
\\jciprod01\productn\D\DPL\66-2\DPL206.txt unknown Seq: 10  8-JUN-17 13:06
614 DEPAUL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 66:605
1. State Law and the Proxy Regulation Rules
While companies may choose to incorporate in any state, Delaware
is the most favored state for incorporation.76  In fact, more than half
of the companies that make up the Fortune 500 are incorporated in
Delaware.77  This makes Delaware law the most commonly used state
law for corporate matters.78  Generally under state statutes, share-
holders elect directors and vote on vital matters, directors watch of-
ficers and approve major corporate decisions, and officers run the
company on a daily basis.79  Shareholders’ substantive rights under
state law can be broken down into three areas: (1) shareholders can
elect directors; (2) shareholders can approve changes in the contract
between managers and shareholders; and (3) shareholders can ap-
prove major changes in a corporation’s structure.80  While state laws
imply that shareholders have substantial rights, shareholders’ control
is very limited.81  This is in part because directors have closer ties to a
corporation’s officers than to its shareholders,82 and also because state
laws impose strict procedural rules that negatively affect sharehold-
ers.83  For example, corporations are required to hold annual meet-
ings, during which shareholders are able to exercise their rights to
vote on directors and other important matters.84  However, most
shareholders vote by proxy rather than by attending the meetings, so
the voting procedure is governed by strict proxy rules.85  The individ-
ual shareholder’s ability to vote for directors is part of the control held
by each shareholder86 via the corporation’s board of directors.87
Rules governing proxy votes are generally viewed as a mechanism of
protection for shareholder voting rights, but the rules have significant
downfalls for shareholders.88  The downfalls include increased costs,
delays, and substantial legal risks, all of which ultimately discourage
76. LEWIS S. BLACK, JR., WHY CORPORATIONS CHOOSE DELAWARE 1 (2007).
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. See Bernard S. Black, Shareholder Passivity Reexamined, 89 MICH. L. REV. 520, 533
(1991).
80. Id. at 534.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 535.
84. Id.
85. Black, supra note 79, at 535. R
86. Id.
87. See Julian Velasco, The Fundamental Rights of the Shareholder, 40 U.C. DAVIS L. REV.
407, 430–31 (2006).
88. See Black, supra note 79, at 536; Stephen Choi, Proxy Issue Proposals: Impact of the 1992 R
SEC Proxy Reforms, 16 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 233, 265–66 (2000).
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communication among shareholders.89  These downfalls affect not
only the average shareholders, but also the activists that set out to
help them.
2. The Sarbanes–Oxley Act and the Stock Exchange Rules
Congress passed the Sarbanes–Oxley Act in 2002 in response to the
scandals at Enron, WorldCom, and Tyco.90  The enactment of SOX
intended to enhance corporate governance while also restoring inves-
tors’ confidence in corporate America.91  It requires that a publicly
held corporation must have a board of directors consisting of a major-
ity of “independent” directors, that an audit committee must consist
of all independent directors, and that there must be regular meetings
held for only the independent directors.92  The NYSE furthers the
SOX standards by requiring that corporations must have corporate
governance and compensation committees that consist entirely of in-
dependent directors.93
The SOX, NASDAQ, and NYSE rules, however, have not had a
pronounced impact on the structure of corporate governance for
American corporations.94  The U.S. system is still deemed to be “regu-
lator led,” meaning the Securities Exchange Commission (SEC) and
the stock exchanges are solely responsible for implementing and en-
forcing proper governance standards.95  In the United States, the sep-
aration of ownership and management allows managers to run
corporations, for the most part, freely.96  While a corporation’s board,
composed of both executive and non-executive directors, has the
power to oversee management, executives hold more power than non-
executive directors.97  This power can ultimately be detrimental to
89. Black, supra note 79, at 536; see infra notes 175–93 and accompanying text. R
90. Awan & Akhtar, supra note 72, at 59. R
91. Julia Hanna, The Costs and Benefits of Sarbanes–Oxley, FORBES (Mar. 10, 2014, 11:15
AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/hbsworkingknowledge/2014/03/10/the-costs-and-benefits-of-
sarbanes-oxley/#44d856362776.
92. Sarbanes–Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified as amended at 15
U.S.C. §§ 78a–78qq (2012)); Marcel Kahan & Edward Rock, Embattled CEOs, 88 TEX. L. REV.
987, 1022–23 (2010).
93. See NYSE, LISTED COMPANY MANUAL §§ 303A.04–05, http://nysemanual.nyse.com/LCM
Tools/PlatformViewer.asp?selectednode=chp_1_4_3_3&manual=%2Flcm%2Fsections%2Flcm-
sections%2F (last visited Feb. 15, 2017); see also Kahan & Rock, supra note 92, at 1023. R
94. Awan & Akhtar, supra note 72, at 60. See generally John C. Coates & Suraj Srinivasan, R
SOX After Ten Years: A Multidisciplinary Review, 28 ACCT. HORIZONS 627 (2014).
95. Ethiopis Tafara, Dir., Office of Int’l Affairs, SEC, Remarks on UK and US Approach to
Corporate Governance and on the Market for Corporate Control (Feb. 8–9, 2007), https://www
.sec.gov/news/speech/2007/spch020807et.htm.
96. Corporate Governance, supra note 75. R
97. Id.
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corporations as executives holding equity in the corporation may be
more concerned about their own financial gains, and shareholders
may not have enough control to remove these self-interested execu-
tives.98  Similarly, the board’s main role is to address conflicts of inter-
est and self-dealing by management, but board members also have
limited involvement in the daily management of corporations.99  For
that reason, a corporation’s board of directors has a limited govern-
ance role.100
Bound by the structural limitations inherent to corporations, SOX
has not reached its full potential.101  State law—primarily Delaware’s
General Corporation Law and related common law—remains at the
center of the corporate governance regime, which has proven to be
unbeneficial to shareholders.102  For example, between 2002 and 2012,
only fifteen Delaware court decisions referred to SOX, and none of
those decisions imposed punishments for the corporations that failed
to follow the SOX standards.103  Even with the implementation of
SOX, the U.S. corporate governance system has not been greatly
changed.
3. Section 13(d) of the Securities Exchange Act
The Williams Act104 was enacted in 1968 as an amendment to the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and as a mechanism of protection
against the activist investors that were deemed to be “corporate raid-
ers.”105  As a result of the Williams Act, Section 13(d) of the Securities
Exchange Act now requires mandatory disclosure of financial and
other information for any person or group with five percent of benefi-
cial ownership in a corporation.106  “Beneficial ownership” is defined
broadly and includes the power, sole or shared, to sell or direct the
98. Is Corporate Governance Better Across the Atlantic?, VALUEWALK (Jan. 11, 2013, 12:55
PM), http://www.valuewalk.com/2013/01/is-corporate-governance-better-across-the-atlantic/
(“[T]his absolute power [of the executives] has a tendency to corrupt or become arrogant.  This
sometimes makes executives work towards personal gains rather than shareholder interests.”).
This problem is worsened by the fact that most shares are widely held and that shareholders are
not involved in the day-to-day management of corporations.  Id.
99. OWEN ET AL., supra note 71, at 91. R
100. Id.
101. Coates & Srinivasan, supra note 94, at 12 (describing how Delaware courts rarely cite R
SOX and have never held a corporate director liable under the law).
102. Id. at 13.
103. Id. at 12.
104. Act of July 29, 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-439, 82 Stat. 455 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C.
§§ 78a–78u-2 (2012)).
105. Nagel et al., supra note 26, at 5. R
106. Securities Exchange Act § 13(d)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d) (2012).
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sale of securities and to vote or direct the voting of securities.107
Under of this broad definition, shareholders and activist investors
alike are wary of gaining ownership that exceeds the five percent
threshold, because if the threshold is exceeded, they are subject to
higher costs, potential lawsuits, and even invasions of privacy.108
While American activists must follow these rules and regulations, the
United Kingdom takes a very different approach.  The next Section
discusses the corporate governance system found across the pond.
D. Corporate Governance in the United Kingdom
While the U.S. corporate governance structure is comprised of fed-
eral statutes and state regulations,109 the UK approach relies to a
greater extent on “soft law” and self-regulatory mechanisms.110  Op-
posite the “regulator led” U.S. approach, the UK corporate govern-
ance system is “shareholder led,” meaning shareholders have the
power to determine what measures are necessary to protect their in-
terests.111  Under this system, there is not a strict enforcement of the
rules and regulations as there is in the United States.112  Instead, there
is a “comply or explain” approach that allows deviation from the rules
if necessary.113  Parties must either comply with the UK codes or dis-
close their noncompliance with an explanation of the inability to com-
107. Black, supra note 79, at 542–43. R
108. Id. (“The company’s managers can and often will sue claiming misdisclosure of one sort
or another, usually that the shareholder has concealed her true intent.  Mere allegation of a
concealed intent is usually enough to warrant court ordered discovery . . . the SEC or other
shareholders can also seek profit disgorgement, and the cost of the suit must be borne win or
lose.”).
109. This approach is characterized by one size fits all approach that is designed to address
common governance problems.  Ruth V. Aguilera et al., Regulation and Comparative Corporate
Governance, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 23, 38 (Mike Wright et
al. eds., 2013).
110. Soft law is characterized by “comply-or-explain approaches” that allow corporations to
choose the governance mechanisms that best fir their business model. Id.; see also Anita Indira
Anand, An Analysis of Enabling vs. Mandatory Corporate Governance Structures Post-Sarbanes-
Oxley, 31 DEL. J. CORP. L. 229–30 (2006).
111. Tafara, supra note 95. R
112. Id.
113. FIN. REPORTING COUNCIL, THE UK APPROACH TO CORPORATE GOVERNANCE (2010),
https://www.frc.org.uk/getattachment/1db9539d-9176-4546-91ee-828b7fd087a8/The-UK-Ap-
proach-to-Corporate-Governance.aspx; see Corporate Governance, supra note 75; see also NO- R
LAN HASKOVEC, MILLSTEIN CTR. FOR CORP. GOVERNANCE &PERFORMANCE, CODES OF
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: A REVIEW 1, 13 (2012), http://web.law.columbia.edu/sites/default/
files/microsites/millstein-center/Codes%20of%20Corporate%20Governance_Yale_053112.pdf
(“The UK codes are not firm regulations, but a roster of principles-based guidelines, compliance
with which is voluntary.  If a company or institutional investor chooses not to follow one, it must
state why.”).
\\jciprod01\productn\D\DPL\66-2\DPL206.txt unknown Seq: 14  8-JUN-17 13:06
618 DEPAUL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 66:605
ply.114  This allows shareholders, other corporations, and the general
public to understand each corporation’s approach to governance.115
The shareholder-led, soft-law approach affects the way that Euro-
pean corporations are governed.116  In Europe, the separation of own-
ership and management is not as clear as it is in the United States.117
The board of a European corporation consists of a variety of people,
ranging from majority shareholders to banks and lenders.118  The Eu-
ropean approach allows for less room for corruption of those in man-
agement positions because shareholders of European corporations are
more involved in the day-to-day management of corporations than are
shareholders of U.S. corporations.119  These ideas are embodied in the
UK Companies Act of 2006,120 which requires the boards of corpora-
tions to focus on shareholder value.121  To ensure that shareholder
value is maximized, the Act provides shareholders with a number of
tools that can assist them in engaging with a corporation and making
their voices heard.122  These tools consist of the shareholders’ ability
to call special meetings, to remove directors relatively easily, and to
submit proposals that remain binding once passed.123  UK corpora-
tions also absorb the costs of shareholder proposals, therefore encour-
aging more frequent proposals.124  These are all tools that
shareholders lack in the United States.125
114. UK STEWARDSHIP CODE 1, 4 (FIN. REPORTING COUNCIL 2012).
115. Id.
116. “The fundamental legal difference between the U.S. system of corporate governance and
the Continental European corporate law system is the way they distribute powers within a cor-
poration.”  Sofie Cools, The Real Difference in Corporate Law Between the United States and
Continental Europe: Distribution of Powers, 30 DEL. J. CORP. L. 697, 738 (2005).
117. Id.
118. See generally HASKOVEC, supra note 113. R
119. “The government does not have a didactic approach because the board structure appears
to have checks and balances which prevent Directors from taking decisions which may be to
their own advantage.” Is Corporate Governance Better Across the Atlantic?, supra note 98. R
120. Companies Act 2006, c. 46 (Eng.), http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2006/46/pdfs/uk
pga_20060046_en.pdf.
121. FIN. REPORTING COUNCIL, THE UK APPROACH, supra note 113, at 6. R
122. Bonnie Buchanan & Tina Yang, A Comparative Analysis of Shareholder Activism in the
US and UK: Evidence from Shareholder Proposals 1, 7 (Oct. 15, 2008) (unpublished manu-
script), http://www.researchgate.net/publication/228452719_A_comparative_analysis_of_share
holder_activism_in_the_US_and_UK_Evidence_from_shareholder_proposals.
123. Id. at 7–8.  Shareholders, holding ten percent or more ownership, have the ability to call
a special meeting to propose and to vote on an amendment to the corporation’s articles of asso-
ciation.  Lucian Arye Bebchuk, The Case for Increasing Shareholder Power, 118 HARV. L. REV.
833, 848–49 (2005).  Under section 303, shareholders can call a special meeting to replace all
directors and then can do so at that meeting with a majority of votes. Id. at 849.
124. Buchanan & Yang, supra note 122, at 2–3. R
125. Aguilera et al., supra note 109, at 28 (“[S]oft norms fill in voids for formal hard law and R
often become an important mechanism for innovation in the regulatory sphere.”).
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The UK Corporate Governance Codes concentrate mainly on the
relationship between corporations and their shareholders.126  By
reaching for good governance practices and ultimately a successful re-
lationship between the two parties, the Code aims for UK corpora-
tions to have long-term success.127  In order to achieve this goal, the
Code lays out a collection of standards of good practice that range
from topics such as board leadership and effectiveness to board ac-
countability and its relations with shareholders.128  In addition to the
UK Corporate Governance Code, the UK Stewardship Code is based
on seven key principles for institutional investors.129  The Stewardship
Code focuses on the relationship between investors and companies to
help increase returns to shareholders, and ensure the efficiency of
governance systems.130  The principles of the code are as follows:
So as to protect and enhance the value that accrues to the ultimate
beneficiary, institution investors should:
1. publicly disclose their policy on how they will discharge their
stewardship responsibilities.
2. have a robust policy on managing conflicts of interest in relation
to stewardship which should be publicly disclosed.
3. monitor their investee companies.
4. establish clear guidelines on when and how they will escalate
their stewardship activities.
5. be willing to act collectively with other investors where
appropriate.
6. have a clear policy on voting and disclosure of voting activity.
7. report periodically on their stewardship and voting activities.131
Taken together, the UK Corporate Governance Code and the UK
Stewardship Code allow shareholders to reap as many benefits as pos-
sible.132  The Codes encourage discussion between investors and the
boards of corporations in which shareholders seek to implement
change.133  When UK corporations decide to follow the Codes under
the “comply or explain approach,” the boards engage with sharehold-
ers regularly and provide them with necessary information that is rele-
126. UK CORP. GOVERNANCE CODE 3 (FIN. REPORTING COUNCIL 2014).
127. Id.
128. Id. at 9–10.
129. UK STEWARDSHIP CODE 5 (FIN. REPORTING COUNCIL 2012).
130. HASKOVEC, supra note 113, at 10. R
131. UK STEWARDSHIP CODE 5 (FIN. REPORTING COUNCIL 2012).
132. “The UK Corporate Governance Code identifies the principles that underlie an effective
board.  The UK Stewardship Code sets out the principles of effective stewardship by investors.
In doing so, the Code assists institutional investors better to exercise their stewardship responsi-
bilities, which in turn gives force to the ‘comply or explain’ system.” Id. at 1.
133. Jeffery Roberts et al., Shareholder Activism in the U.K. – An Introduction, WALL ST.
LAW., May 2013, at 1, 7.
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vant to their concerns.134  Policies such as this have led to the
successful operation of governance regimes within corporations in the
United Kingdom, causing American activists to travel abroad to take
advantage of the shareholder friendly system.135
E. The Migration of American Activists to Europe
While speaking at the University of Oxford’s Said Business School
in October of 2013, activist shareholder William Ackman of Pershing
Square Capital stated that shareholder activism in Europe was “going
to happen.”136  One month later, Gilberto Pozzi, who heads the Euro-
pean mergers and acquisitions department at Goldman Sachs stated,
“U.S. activists are likely to target European opportunities in the short
to medium term.”137  Ackman and Pozzi were correct, as overcrowd-
ing in the United States’ market, lower valuations, and most impor-
tantly, more shareholder friendly European laws, have increased the
appeal of moving abroad.138
With the enactment of the UK Corporate Governance Code and
the UK Stewardship Code, the United Kingdom has indeed become
one of the most activist friendly markets in not only Europe, but in
the world.139  For that reason, the United Kingdom may be the most
ideal setting for shareholder activism.140  The diverse laws and rights
in the United States and United Kingdom demonstrate how activists
may have more influence abroad than in their home arena.141  Two of
the most significant differences stem from (1) the ability of UK share-
holders with just 5% of stock ownership to request a shareholder
134. Id.
135. OWEN ET AL., supra note 71, at 27–28 (2006) (“[T]he effectiveness of this system is driven R
by the UK ownership and institutional structure which gives greater influence over the board of
directors to institutional investors than in either the US or Continental Europe.”).
136. Chad Bray, Ackman Sees Expansion of Activist Investing to Europe, N.Y. TIMES:
DEALBOOK (Oct. 29, 2013, 5:32 PM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2013/10/29/ackman-sees-ex-
pansion-of-activist-investing-to-europe/?_r=0.
137. Nathan Vardi, American Activist Investors Get Ready to Invade Europe, FORBES (Dec.
20, 2013, 8:34 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/nathanvardi/2013/12/20/american-activist-inves
tors-get-ready-to-invade-europe-2/.
138. Flaherty & Cruise, supra note 10. R
139. SKADDEN, ARPS, SLATE, MEAGHER & FLOM LLP, ACTIVIST INVESTING IN EUROPE: A
SPECIAL REPORT 4 (2014), http://www.skadden.com/newsletters/Activist_Investing_in_Europe_
October_2014_Skadden_Special_Report.pdf.
140. Marco Becht et. al., Returns to Shareholder Activism: Evidence from a Clinical Study of
the Hermes U.K. Focus Fund, 22 REV. FIN. STUD. 3093, 3095 (2009).
141. MACFARLANES LLP, ACTIVISM: 10 KEY DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE US AND THE UK
(2015), http://www.macfarlanes.com/media/452974/activism-10-key-differences-between-the-us-
and-the-ukv2.pdf (“These statutory shareholder rights are extremely powerful weapons in the
activist’s arsenal.”).
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meeting, and (2) at that shareholder meeting, shareholders can re-
move directors with 50% of the vote, as opposed to the majority rule
that is required in the United States.142  The inability for corporations
to use poison pills143 as a method of protection against activists may
also be a leading reason for the migration, as this prevents manage-
ment from blocking takeover bids and leaves shareholders with the
power to decide what to do when investors seek change.144  Further-
more, annual general meetings in the United States make it difficult
for activist investors to gain access to the board when corporations are
not taking steps to maximize shareholder value.145
In favor of both the structure and substance of the UK corporate
governance laws, shareholders are migrating abroad and taking with
them the opportunity for the U.S. market to grow and flourish.146  For
example, San Francisco-based ValueAct Capital recently set its sights
on British company and aerospace giant, Rolls Royce.147  After doing
so, ValueAct Capital acquired a 10.8% stake in Rolls Royce.148  Even
with such a large stake, Rolls-Royce “embraced ValueAct” and stated
that there was no friction; the activists and the company were working
together to turn the company around.149  The collaboration has
proven to be successful.  Rolls-Royce has appointed Bradley Singer, a
142. See SKADDEN, supra note 139, at 4; see also OWEN ET AL., supra note 71, at 3. R
143. See Chase de Kay Wilson, Marty Lipton’s Poison Pill, INT’L FIN. L. REV., May 1984, at
10–11.  Poison Pills are strategies used by corporations to discourage hostile takeovers and pro-
tect shareholders.  When a company decides that a bid for a takeover is not acceptable, it issues
tax-free dividends to shareholders in the form of preferred stock, which converts into a larger
number of common shares and creates an incentive for the shareholder to keep the stock and
refuse a tender. See David Futrelle, Corporate Raiders Beware: A Short History of the “Posion
Pill” Takeover Defense, TIME (Nov. 7, 2012), http://business.time.com/2012/11/07/corporate-raid-
ers-beware-a-short-history-of-the-poison-pill-takeover-defense/ (“Netflix’ [sic] poison pill is
what’s known as a ‘flip-in’ plan, which offers shareholders the opportunity to buy discounted
shares once a hostile shareholder has gobbled up a certain percentage of shares, usually 15%.”).
144. See Bebchuk et al., The Long-Term Effects, supra note 29, at 849; see also SKADDEN, R
supra note 139, at 4. R
145. OWEN ET AL., supra note 71, at 15.  For example, Berkshire Hathaway’s annual meeting R
is described as having a “day-long, carnival-like atmosphere” that includes comedy skits, music
and dancing, and games.  Lisa Smith, A Peak into Shareholder Meetings, INVESTOPEDIA, http://
www.investopedia.com/articles/investing/062413/peek-shareholder-meetings.asp (last visited
March 23, 2017).  The business portion of the meeting only takes around 20 minutes and occurs
in a “largely scripted manner.” Id.  For this reason, “[w]hile individual investors may have opin-
ions of various topics and are able to express those opinions by putting forth proposals, the
biggest voting blocks are often the financial institutions, pension funds and similar entities that
hold large stakes in the firms.” Id.
146. Flaherty & Cruise, supra note 10. R
147. Rolls-Royce Gives Board Seat to Activist Shareholder, BBC (Mar. 2, 2016), http://www
.bbc.com/news/business-35704485.
148. Id.
149. Id.
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partner and chief operating office of ValueAct Capital, to the board of
directors in order to give ValueAct a bigger voice as they work to-
gether to improve the corporation.150  Part III discusses the changes
that could be made in the United States in order to prevent more
activists from crossing the pond, as ValueAct has done.
III. ANALYSIS
In 2015, activist shareholders targeted 131 companies outside of the
United States, which is a 47% increase from the year before.151  Activ-
ists prefer to target corporations in a country such as the United King-
dom, where the laws enable them to make their desired changes more
easily.152  This preference has already turned into action as American
activists are targeting more corporations outside of the United States
than ever before.153  In 2016, the United Kingdom experienced a
forty-six percent increase in activist campaigns over 2015 figures,
which was the largest increase of any European country.154  This fig-
ure will only continue to increase if the United States’ corporate gov-
ernance system is not reformed.
The United States should alter its corporate governance system to
reflect the shareholder-friendly policies embodied in the United King-
dom’s corporate governance laws.  Current U.S. laws, primarily Sec-
tion 13(d) of the Securities Exchange Act and the proxy regulation
rules, do not allow activists to reach their full potential to create
change in corporate America.  In order to retain the American activist
investors in the United States, the UK Stewardship Code’s fifth and
sixth principles and Section E.1 and E.2 of the UK Corporate Govern-
ance Code should be incorporated into the U.S. corporate governance
system.  This combined corporate governance system would convince
150. Activist Investor ValueAct Gets Its Rolls-Royce Board Seat, FORTUNE (Mar. 2, 2016, 4:41
AM), http://fortune.com/2016/03/02/rolls-royce-valueact-board-seat/.
151. Flaherty & Cruise, supra note 10. R
152. OWEN ET AL., supra note 71 at 57 (“In the UK, both public and private sector funds are R
more engaged in pragmatic investor activism as compared to the US, as they do not face the
same conflicts of interests.”).
153. Flaherty & Cruise, supra note 10; Juliet Samuel, American Activist Investors Take An- R
other Charge at Europe, WALL ST. J. (Apr. 22, 2015, 4:08 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/amer-
ican-activist-investors-take-another-charge-at-europe-1429733285; see also Billy Bambrough,
The Revolution Will Be Monetised: Activist Investors Are Closing in on a Record Year, CITY
A.M. (Nov. 5, 2015 12:02 AM), http://www.cityam.com/228048/the-revolution-will-be-monetised-
activist-investors-are-closing-in-on-a-record-year (“So far this year, the UK has been a hotbed of
investor activism, with 32 so called ‘activist actions’ more than any other European country.”).
154. Chelsea Naso, Shareholder Activism Catching Fire in Europe, Asia, LAW360 (May 16,
2016, 2:44 PM), http://www.law360.com/articles/796152/shareholder-activism-catching-fire-in-eu
rope-asia.
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American activists to keep capital in the United States by allowing
them to more easily enact changes in American corporations.  This
Part first describes the ways in which the activists are restricted in the
United States and then details the portions of the UK law that would
be beneficial for activist investors in their homeland.  Part III con-
cludes by identifying how the United States could operate under a
merged corporate governance system combined of the favorable laws
from both countries.
A. U.S. Corporate Governance Laws Are Holding Activists Back
Majority shareholders in the United States are given various legal
rights.155  These rights range from the right to vote and to inspect cor-
porate books and records to the right to sell shares and receive divi-
dend payments.156  Mary L. Schapiro, Chairman of the SEC, discussed
these rights in a speech given on December 15, 2011.157  She stated,
Shareholders should have a voice and a straightforward and trans-
parent process for engaging with companies on issues that are im-
portant to them.  Shareholders and boards should have clear
conversations about how the company is governed — and why and
how decisions are made.  As a general rule, interested, aware and
active shareholders are good for public companies, and I believe
that more shareholder engagement is better.158
The United States, however, has done little to ensure that shareholder
engagement actually occurs.159  The separation of ownership and man-
agement leads many managers to pursue goals that are not beneficial
to shareholders.  In order to remedy this, various laws have been
passed in the United States that make many important corporate gov-
ernance features the subject of mandatory regulation.160  Conversely,
instead of propelling activist shareholders forward, these laws are ac-
tually holding activists back.161  In particular, Section 13(d) of the Se-
curities Exchange Act and the rules that govern proxy regulation act
155. Julian Velasco, The Fundamental Rights of the Shareholder, 40 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 407,
413 (2006).
156. FRED R. KAEN, A BLUEPRINT FOR CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: STRATEGY, ACCOUNTA-
BILITY, AND THE PRESERVATION OF SHAREHOLDER VALUE 178 (2003).
157. Mary L. Schapiro, Chairman, SEC, Remarks at the Translatlantic Corporate Governance
Dialogue (Dec. 15, 2011), https://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2011/spch121511mls.htm.
158. Id.
159. For example, the Sarbanes–Oxley Act has done nothing to change the basic structure of
corporate governance in America.  Awan & Akhtar, supra note 72, at 60. R
160. See e.g., Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a–78qq (2012); Sarbanes–Oxley
Act of 2002, 15 U.S.C. §§ 7201–7266 (2012); Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer
Protection Act, 12 U.S.C. §§ 5301–5641 (2012).
161. “The current state of shareholder rights is the result of an unfortunate blend of compet-
ing regulations that undermine more fundamental aspects of corporate law and therefore would
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as two of the least shareholder friendly policies in the United
States.162  As a result, shareholders are given little to no management
rights and are very restricted in the ways they may communicate with
board members, causing activists and the advantages they provide to
migrate abroad.163
1. Section 13(d) of the Securities Exchange Act
Section 13(d) of the Securities Exchange Act is often cited as a rea-
son for lower coordinated performance in the shareholder activism
field.164  While coordinated activism would allow all varieties of share-
holders to work together to create greater change in American corpo-
rations, such a situation is rare.165  The rarity of this form of activist
intervention makes the push for even stricter disclosure rules alarm-
ing.166  In March of 2011, Watchtell, Lipton, Rosen, & Katz sent a
petition to the SEC to amend section 13(d) of the Securities Exchange
Act.167  In the petition, Wachtell requested that section 13(d) be
amended to “shorten the reporting deadline and expand the definition
of beneficial ownership under the reporting rules.”168  Specifically,
Wachtell first requested that the disclosure window be shortened from
ten days to one day after gaining five percent ownership.169  Wachtell
also requested that the definition of “beneficial ownership” be ex-
panded to include “ownership of any derivative instrument which in-
cludes the opportunity, directly or indirectly, to profit or share in any
profit derived from any increase in the value of the subject secur-
ity.”170  In making these amendments, Wachtell argued that investors,
as well as the market as a whole, would benefit.171  In similar fashion,
benefit from reform.”  Julian Velasco, Taking Shareholder Rights Seriously, 41 U.C. DAVIS L.
REV. 605, 610 (2007).
162. See generally Awan & Akhtar, supra note 72. R
163. Velasco, supra note 155, at 407 (“The history of corporate law has been one of increasing R
flexibility for directors and decreasing rights for shareholders.  Although the law seems to have
coalesced around the norm of shareholder primacy, this is not necessarily reflected in the specific
legal rights of the shareholder.”).
164. Bernard S. Black, Shareholder Activism and Corporate Governance in the United States,
in THE NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS AND THE LAW 459, 461 (Peter Newman,
ed., 1998).
165. Id. (“[E]ach institution acts as a lone wolf (though hoping for informal support from
other institutions), and two institutions try not to target the same firm in the same year.”).
166. Id.
167. Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz, Petition for Rulemaking Under Section 13 of the Secur-
ities Exchange Act of 1934 (Mar. 7, 2011), https://www.sec.gov/rules/petitions/2011/petn4-624
.pdf.
168. Id. at 1.
169. Id. at 3, 5.
170. Id. at 8.
171. Id. at 1.
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two Senators, Tammy Baldwin of Wisconsin and Jeff Merkley of Ore-
gon, introduced the Brokaw Act in March 2016, in order to “rein in
Wall Street.”172  The justification for this new legislation was the belief
that activist investors are leaders of only short-term changes in corpo-
rate America.173  The bill would have reduced the ten-day disclosure
period to two days, required the disclosure of holdings that currently
do not have to be reported, and would have altered who has the duty
to report in general after acquiring at least five percent of a corpora-
tion’s shares.174
There are numerous problems with Wachtell’s petition and the pro-
posed Brokaw Act.  Tightening the disclosure rules of section 13(d)
would increase costs for shareholders.175  Shareholders would likely
lose money, both directly and indirectly, because activist campaigns
are less likely to occur with stricter disclosure rules.176  Directly,
shareholders would not be able to benefit from the higher stock re-
turns that are associated with activist campaigns.177  Indirectly, the
more restrictive disclosure rules would discourage activist investors
from launching campaigns in the United States.178  Because activists
bear the costs of their campaigns, they will avoid situations in which
the campaign benefits do not justify the costs.179  An earlier disclosure
period would increase the costs of acquiring stock in corporations and
would increase administrative costs in complying with the SEC,
172. Antoine Gara, Bernie Sanders and Elizabeth Warren Back Useless Bill to Regulate Hedge
Fund Activism, FORBES (Mar. 17, 2016, 5:16 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/antoinegara/2016/
03/17/bernie-sanders-and-elizabeth-warren-back-useless-bill-to-regulate-hedge-fund-activism/
#64ba5f968af0.
173. Id.
174. See Claire Groden, These Senators Want to Reign in Activist Investors, FORTUNE (Mar.
18, 2016, 3:04 PM), http://fortune.com/2016/03/18/democrats-shareholder-activism/; Liz Moyer, 2
Senate Democrats Introduce Bill to Curb Activist Hedge Funds, N.Y. TIMES, (Mar. 17, 2016),
http://www.nytimes.com/2016/03/18/business/dealbook/2-senate-democrats-introduce-bill-to-
curb-activist-hedge-funds.html?_r=1.
175. Lucian A. Bebchuk et al., Pre-Disclosure Accumulations By Activist Investors: Evidence
& Policy, 39 J. CORP. L. 1, 18 (2013) (“These costs arise from the simple fact that requiring
activist investors to disclose their ownership in public companies more quickly will reduce these
investors’ returns—thereby reducing the incidence and magnitude of outside blockholdings in
large public companies.”).
176. Id. at 19.
177. Id.; see Jason W. Soncini, The Brokaw Act’s Long-Term Consequences for Activists,
LAW360 (Apr. 15, 2016, 10:29 AM), http://www.law360.com/articles/784189/the-brokaw-act-s-
long-term-consequences-for-activists (“[T]he focus on the elimination of short-termism via the
elimination of activism seems misguided.  Those who decry activists ignore the positive, long-
term role activists play in the economy and the profound risk of increased management en-
trenchment if Congress hobbles the activist community.”).
178. Bebchuk et al., Pre-Disclosure Accumulations, supra note 175, at 18. R
179. Soncini, supra note 177. R
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thereby reducing returns.180  With costs likely outweighing the bene-
fits, the disclosure period would trigger an adverse effect of lowering
the activists’ incentive to launch campaigns in the first place.181  With
less activist campaigns, shareholders would likely lose money, as they
would not be able to benefit from the activist campaigns that decrease
managerial problems and increase shareholder value.182  The SEC
must examine the benefits of activist shareholder campaigns before
making any decisions regarding the petition and proposed legisla-
tion.183  If the fundamental changes of either proposal ever pass, they
will surely provide even more encouragement for the activists to move
abroad to find companies, and their jurisdiction’s laws, that are better
suited for their investments.
Activists also benefit other shareholders by increasing the possibil-
ity of a proxy fight, which plays a large role in ensuring that directors
remain accountable for a corporation’s performance.184  Activist com-
panies have the capital to bear the costs involved in a proxy challenge,
whereas shareholders with a lower amount of shares generally do not
have the money to do so.185  Without activist intervention, “incumbent
directors and executives face a substantially reduced threat of a proxy
fight in case of underperformance, and this insulation from the possi-
bility of a proxy fight will be likely to have an adverse effect on share-
holder interests, increasing agency costs, and managerial slack.”186
The U.S. law puts these activists at a “greater disadvantage than they
face in other relevant jurisdictions.”187  In fact, the United States is the
only common law country where an “outside blockholder disclosing
its presence [must] fear being immediately subject to a poison pill”188
180. Id.
181. Bebchuk et al., The Long-Term Effects, supra note 29, at 18–19. R
182. Id. at 19.
183. See Lucian A. Bebchuk & Robert J. Jackson, Jr., The Law and Economics of Blockholder
Disclosure, 2 HARV. BUS. L. REV. 39, 51 (2012).
“Before tightening the rules governing the outside investors who hold large blocks of
public company stock, regulators should carefully consider the valuable role that these
outside blockholders play in corporate governance, the increased agency costs and
managerial slack that would arise if outside blockholders are discouraged or sup-
pressed, and the significant empirical evidence on the benefits produced by outside
blockholders. These considerations should play a role in the Commission’s examination
of the rules governing outside blockholders.”
Id.
184. Id. at 49.
185. Id.
186. Id.
187. Id. at 57.
188. Bebchuk & Jackson, supra note 183, at 58; see supra note 143 and accompanying text R
(discussing poison pills).
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that limits the ability of activists to gain ownership in a corporation.189
A Delaware court, for example, recently held that a board could use a
poison pill to block a fair and reasonable tender offer, essentially
preventing shareholders from making their own decisions about
tendering their shares.190  Even though the shareholders were willing
to accept the offer, the court found that state law gave the board of
directors the power to make decisions for the shareholders.191  This
holding demonstrated that under current law, the only way sharehold-
ers can have a say in the corporation is through the board of directors,
and that is not always sufficient.192  This problem not only plays a role
in corporate governance, but also puts the U.S. market at a disadvan-
tage.193  For that reason, the United States should adopt the share-
holder friendly principles found in the United Kingdom so activists
will remain in the United States, thus strengthening our market.
2. Proxy Regulation Rules
Proxy Rules require that those who solicit proxies must give a writ-
ten statement with various disclosures to the SEC at least ten days
before the proxy distribution mailing date so that the SEC can object
to any statements.194  This preclearance mechanism is not only expen-
sive for shareholders, but it often delays their efforts.195  This is espe-
cially true when shareholder statements discuss director election
campaigns and oppositions to management proposals.196  In these situ-
ations, within a small time period between the date of the company
proxy statement and the date of the shareholder meeting, a share-
holder must make a decision regarding the proposal, prepare and
clear the proxy materials with the SEC, distribute the proxy materials,
and get votes back.197  This problematic issue is best explained by an
analogy:
[I]magine a political campaign where each contestant, and each
newspaper commenting on the campaign, had to state a long list of
prescribed facts, including all ‘material’ facts, avoid misleading any-
one, correct any prior statements which were no longer accurate,
189. Steven Davidoff Solomon, Poison Pill’s Relevance in the Age of Shareholder Activism,
N.Y. TIMES: DEALBOOK (Apr. 18, 2014, 2:31 PM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2014/04/18/
poison-pills-relevance-in-the-age-of-shareholder-activism/.
190. Air Prods. & Chems., Inc. v. Airgas, Inc., 16 A.3d 48, 108–11 (Del. Ch. 2011).
191. Id. at 129.
192. See id.
193. Bebchuk & Jackson, supra note 183, at 58. R
194. Black, supra note 79, at 537–38. R
195. Id. at 538–39.
196. Id. at 539–40.
197. Id. at 539.
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and pre-clear everything with a government agency, in an environ-
ment where the central concept of materiality has only the vaguest
of definitions and incumbent officials can use public funds to sue
their opponents claiming failure to do any of the above, with no
requirement that they show any concrete harm.198
Although it would be nearly impossible for all politicians and political
reporters alike to take such extreme measures, that is exactly what is
expected of shareholders.  While attempting to make large decisions
and enact change, shareholders must work quickly and without error
to ensure that they are complying with the governing rules.199  This
creates a large obstruction in the means of accomplishing their goals.
Directly related to the ability to vote for directors is the ability, or
rather inability, for shareholders to nominate directors.200  In order to
nominate directors, shareholders must submit proposals under Rule
14a-8 of the Securities Exchange Commission, which limits the share-
holders’ supporting proxy statement to 500 words.201  The proposal
must be submitted six months before the date of the shareholder
meeting, and it is also limited in scope.202  The scope of the proposal is
limited in two specific ways: The proposal cannot be used to nominate
candidates for the board of directors—one of the most important is-
sues to shareholders—203 and the proposal may not make statements
in opposition to management proposals or for alternatives to manage-
ment proposals.204  While shareholders are clearly limited in their
proxy statement proposals, a corporation’s management can oppose
statements without word limit restriction, can note the opposition on
the proxy card in bold print, and can spend corporate funds to solicit
votes against proposals they are against.205
A study conducted on thousands of corporations active between
1996 and 2002 found that there was an average of only seven chal-
lenges to directors per year.206  These challenges have proven to be
even more difficult when corporations have “staggered boards,” in
which only one-third of the board’s total number of directors are
198. Black, supra note 79, at 539–40. R
199. Id.
200. Id. at 539.
201. 17 C.F.R. 240.14a-8 (2016).
202. Black, supra note 79, at 541. R
203. Id. at 541–42.
204. Id. at 540.
205. See Bebchuk, The Case for Increasing Shareholder Power, supra note 123, at 856. R
206. Lucian Arye Bebchuk, The Case for Shareholder Access to the Ballot, 59 BUS. LAW. 43,
44–46 (2003).
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elected each year.207  When corporations are set up in such a way,
shareholders must win, at a minimum, two consecutive proxy fights in
order to gain board control.208  After examining the hardships that
shareholders must face while attempting to have their voices heard, it
is no surprise that many shareholders adopt the “Wall Street Rule.”209
This rule subscribes to the idea that it is easier to switch than fight,
meaning that shareholders may choose to simply invest in a new com-
pany rather than fight for changes in the current company in which
they have invested.210
As many activist shareholders seek to change the management as-
pects in corporations, it is clearly problematic that shareholders are
often willing to give up rather than to fight for their legal rights in the
corporations in which they own stock.211  For example, when share-
holders decide to waive the “‘white flag’ in the battlefield of corporate
governance,” shareholders exit the corporation while the board con-
tinues to manage the company in whatever manner it desires.212
While selling the shares is a short-term solution to rid a shareholder of
a bad corporate governance regime inside of the corporation, “the cu-
mulative effect of such acts may also profoundly impact the quality of
our products and environment, the treatment of employees, our bal-
ance of payments, and the well being of society-at-large.”213  U.S. laws
should encourage shareholders to enact changes in corporations
rather than encouraging them to abandon the corporation, thereby
creating numerous negative side effects for all of corporate America.
In order to create an encouraging environment, aspects of the UK and
207. George W. Dent, Jr., The Essential Unity of Shareholders and the Myth of Investor Short-
Termism, 35 DEL. J. CORP. L. 97, 146 (2010).
208. Id.
209. Stephen M. Bainbridge, Redirecting State Takeover Laws a Proxy Contests, 1992 WIS. L.
REV. 1071, 1080 (1992).
210. Id. (“To the extent the shareholders are satisfied, they will vote for management.  Dis-
gruntled shareholders, in contrast, will have long since sold out.  As a result, shareholders are
likely to vote for management even where that is not the decision an informed shareholder
would reach.”).
211. In 2013, “the most popular activist strategy was seeking board representation, followed
by the removal of a CEO or director, according to data from Activist Insight, which tracks the
industry.”  Jeff Green & Beth Jinks, Activists Step Up to Revamp C Suite at Microsoft to J.C.
Penney, BLOOMBERG (Aug. 25, 2013, 11:01 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2013-
08-26/activists-step-up-to-revamp-c-suite-at-microsoft-to-j-c-penney.
212. Brandon Chen, Board Monitoring and the Wall Street Rule 2 (Sept. 20, 2010) (unpub-
lished manuscript), http://ssrn.com/abstract=1659436; see Ending the Wall Street Walk: Why Cor-
porate Governance Now? (1996), CORP. GOVERNANCE, http://www.corpgov.net/library/papers-
references/ending-the-wall-street-walk-why-corporate-governance-now/ (last visited Aug. 24,
2016) (“The reality is that if you don’t like the way the management handles your business, you
have traditionally had two choices: hold your nose or sell out.”).
213. Ending the Wall Street Walk, supra note 212. R
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the U.S. corporate governance systems should be merged in order to
create a governance regime that allows for all shareholders, including
activists, to fight and implement necessary changes.
B. How to Keep Our Investors in The Homeland
In the post-Sarbanes–Oxley world, it seems likely that any reform
that takes place in the United States will entail even more rules and
regulations.214  However, the addition of stricter rules and the tighten-
ing of the rules already in place will only continue to push activist
investors out.215  Instead, some form of compromise needs to be
reached in order to keep the domestic activists in the United States.
This Comment argues that the United Kingdom is the most ideal
country from which to model a corporate governance reform.  In the
UK, it is agreed upon that “shareholders are the company.”216  As a
result, shareholders in UK companies are granted more powers in re-
lation to governance and participation than compared to their U.S.
counterparts.217  This allows normal UK shareholders, as well as ac-
tivist shareholders, to have a greater chance at enacting changes in the
corporations in which they invest.218
According to the Financial Reporting Council (FRC), the intended
beneficiaries of corporate governance laws are the shareholders, and
they should decide whether or not a corporation’s governance prac-
tices are effective and allow the corporation to succeed.219  In order
for shareholders to decide what is best for a corporation in the long-
term, the FRC notes that they must be well-informed and engaged
investors.220  For that reason, the FRC acts as a regulator to ensure
that shareholders have all of the necessary information to properly
assess the corporate governance tactics within corporations.221
The FRC enacted the UK Stewardship Code and the UK Corporate
Governance Code to properly regulate shareholders and corpora-
tions.222  According to the UK Stewardship Code, investors should
aim to promote the long-term success of corporations so that corpora-
214. OWEN ET AL., supra note 71, at 28. R
215. See generally Flaherty & Cruise, supra note 10. R
216. OWEN ET AL., supra note 71, at 29. R
217. Iris H-Y Chiu, Reviving Shareholder Stewardship: Critically Examining the Impact of
Corporate Transparency Reforms in the UK, 38 DEL. J. CORP. L. 983, 994 (2014).
218. Id.
219. FIN. REPORTING COUNCIL, THE UK APPROACH, supra note 113, at 7. R
220. Id.
221. Id.
222. See generally FIN. REPORTING COUNCIL, THE UK APPROACH, supra note 113. R
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tions, shareholders, and the economy as a whole benefit.223  The Stew-
ardship Code thus lays out good practice principles for investors to
follow.224  In similar fashion, the UK Corporate Governance Code
lays out a set of governance standards that corporations should fol-
low.225  These standards ensure shareholder protection.226  Although
the Codes operate on the “comply or explain” basis,227 a majority of
corporations comply with the standards set forth in the Codes, proving
that the soft-law-enabling approach of the United Kingdom is success-
ful.228  The success of the “comply or explain” model has provoked
some to argue that the United States can and should learn from the
UK approach.229
While all of the standards set forth in the Codes are respectable, it
would be nearly impossible, and also unhelpful, to apply the Codes in
their entirety to the American legal system.230  This, in part, is because
the United States and the United Kingdom have different markets.231
The UK laws were designed to allow sophisticated and mobile inves-
tors to navigate the laws themselves.232  The U.S. laws, on the other
hand, were designed for less sophisticated investors so that govern-
ment authorities could enforce the laws on behalf of the investors.233
223. UK STEWARDSHIP CODE 1 (FIN. REPORTING COUNCIL 2012).
224. Id. at 5.
225. UK CORP. GOVERNANCE CODE 2 (FIN. REPORTING COUNCIL 2014).
226. Id. at 3.
227. See infra note 113 and accompanying text. R
228. Corporate Governance and Stewardship, FIN. REPORTING COUNCIL, https://www
.frc.org.uk/Our-Work/Codes-Standards/Corporate-governance.aspx (last visited Aug. 24, 2016).
See generally BLACKROCK, STATEMENT ON COMPLIANCE WITH THE UK STEWARDSHIP CODE
(2012), http://www.gla.ac.uk/media/media_278029_en.pdf; CHESHIRE PENSION FUND, UK STEW-
ARDSHIP CODE–COMPLIANCE STATEMENT (2011), http://www.cheshirepensionfund.org/wp-con-
tent/uploads/2013/02/UK-Stewardship-Code-2011-Compliance-Statement.pdf; INFRARED
CAPITAL PARTNERS, UK STEWARDSHIP CODE DISCLOSURE STATEMENT (2015), http://ircp.com/
files/Downloads/UK%20Stewardship%20Code%20Disclosure%20Statement.pdf.
229. Bernard S. Black & John C. Coffee, Jr., Hail Britannia?: Institutional Investor Behavior
Under Limited Regulation, 92 MICH. L. REV. 1997, 2086 (1994) (“[T]he British experience sug-
gests two lessons for the United States: (i) Reduce regulatory controls and institutional investors
will become more active; and (ii) reduce regulatory controls and other constraints will surface
that preclude radical change.”).
230. Tafara, supra note 95. R
231. Id.
232. Id.
233. In her speech, Tafara analogized the U.S. market to a public roadway and the UK market
to an F1 circuit. Id.  He gave the analogy that on a public roadway, regardless of if you are a
speed racer or a little old woman, the speed limit is always going to be 55 miles per hour.  In an
F1 circuit, however, the speeds range at a much higher limit.  Just as an average U.S. motorist
would not succeed in a Formula 1 race against an experienced racecar driver, the strict U.S. laws
would not succeed in the U.K. Id.  Similarly, just as a racecar driver that is used to speeds of 190
miles per hour would not succeed at driving at a much lower speed limit along public roads, the
flexible U.K. laws would not succeed in the United States.  Id.
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Additionally, if the entire UK corporate governance system was
adopted in the United States, it could potentially give shareholders
too much power, and thus take away the need for activist sharehold-
ers.234  For that reason, this Comment proposes a compromise: The
United Should apply portions of the UK laws to its governance sys-
tem.  Specifically, Principle 5 and 6 of the UK Stewardship Code, as
well as Section E of the UK Corporate Governance Code, should be
implemented in the United States.  Doing so would allow activists to
remain in the United States and would allow them to generate their
desired changes that benefit shareholders and corporations alike.
1. The UK Codes To Be Followed in the United States
The UK Stewardship Code and the UK Corporate Governance
Code aim to ensure that shareholder protectionism methods are al-
ways present.235  Therefore, certain parts of the Codes would be bene-
ficial in the United States in order to ensure that shareholders,
activists, and corporations can all work together for the greater good
of each party.
First, the UK Stewardship Code’s fifth principle, along with Section
E.1 of the UK Corporate Governance Code, would be beneficial for
both activists and general shareholders, as it would promote collabo-
ration among all interested parties.  Principle 5 states, “Institutional
investors should be willing to act collectively with other investors
where appropriate.”236  As guidance, the Code provides that investors
should all communicate and work together in order to achieve their
objectives.237  Section E.1 states, “There should be a dialogue with
shareholders based on the mutual understanding of objectives” and
“[t]he board as a whole has responsibility for ensuring that a satisfac-
tory dialogue with shareholders takes place.”238  Under this section,
directors are encouraged to attend meetings with shareholders in or-
der to understand all of the issues and concerns that are of importance
234. Samuel, supra note 153. (“Some investors say activism hasn’t previously taken off in Eu- R
rope partly because laws in some European countries give shareholders a bigger voice than they
would have in the U.S., making activism less necessary.”).
235. See UK STEWARDSHIP CODE 5–6 (FIN. REPORTING COUNCIL 2012); see also FIN. RE-
PORTING COUNCIL, THE UK APPROACH, supra note 113, at 6–8. R
236. UK STEWARDSHIP CODE 8 (FIN. REPORTING COUNCIL 2012); see also Konstantinos Ser-
gakis, The UK Stewardship Code: Bridging the Gap Between Companies and Institutional Inves-
tors, 47 R.J.T. N.S. 109, 130 (2013) (“The scope of this principle is not just to extract information
about how the strategy of an investor group can be shaped along with that of another group, but
also to encourage interconnectivity between the same pools of investors in a wider context, since
they will ultimately all be affected by the company’s progression.”).
237. Sergakis, supra note 236, at 119. R
238. UK CORP. GOVERNANCE CODE 22 (FIN. REPORTING COUNCIL 2014).
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to the shareholders.239  Even before shareholders become “beneficial
owners” of a corporation, boards often meet with shareholders to dis-
cuss their interests.240  Although not legally necessary, this shows how
UK corporations are willing to work with shareholders in order to
hear their concerns and maximize their value.241  The teamwork be-
tween UK corporations and their shareholders varies greatly from the
relationship, or lack thereof, between American corporations and
their shareholders, as previously discussed.242  By incorporating these
ideas in the U.S. governance regime, shareholders and the corpora-
tions could be seen as teammates, rather than, at times, enemies.
Second, the sixth principle of the UK Stewardship Code and Sec-
tion E.2 of the UK Corporate Governance Code would also provide
substantial benefits for activists, and therefore all shareholders, by
continuing to promote unity between parties.243  The sixth principle
states, “Institutional investors should have a clear policy on voting and
disclosure of voting activity.”244  More importantly, this rule specifies
that investors should not automatically support the board of a corpo-
ration in which it owns shares.245  Section E.2 states that “the board
should use general meetings to communicate with investors and to en-
courage their participation.”246  Under this section, when resolutions
are proposed, shareholders may vote either for or against the resolu-
tion via proxy forms.247
While U.S. shareholders must rely entirely on the board of a corpo-
ration for the protection of their benefits, UK boards work as dele-
gates or agents of the shareholders.248  Considering that board
members owe fiduciary duties to the corporation itself, instead of the
shareholders, the benefits of U.S. shareholders are not always ade-
quately protected.249  Conversely, board members in the UK owe
their fiduciary duties to the corporation’s shareholders, therefore en-
suring adequate shareholder protection.250  The benefits of these laws
can be seen in the takeover talks between Pfizer and the UK’s As-
239. Id.
240. Roberts et al., supra note 133. R
241. Id.
242. See supra notes 71–135 and accompanying text. R
243. UK STEWARDSHIP CODE 5 (FIN. REPORTING COUNCIL 2012).
244. Id. at 9.
245. Id.
246. UK CORP. GOVERNANCE CODE 22 (FIN. REPORTING COUNCIL 2014).
247. Id.
248. OWEN ET AL., supra note 71, at 26. R
249. Id. at 29.
250. Id.
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traZeneca.251  The decision of whether the takeover would take place
or not was left in the hands of the board.252  However, because of the
UK Codes, this decision was actually in the hands of the sharehold-
ers.253  For that reason, the takeover did not occur because the share-
holders felt uneasy about the payments they would receive from their
holdings of shares in the combined corporation.254  The denial of this
takeover by the AstraZeneca’s shareholders exemplifies the role the
Code plays in the day-to-day business of UK corporations, as well as
the power that the shareholders hold.255
These provisions of the UK Codes give UK shareholders more
power than U.S. shareholders.  It is easier for activists in the UK to
not only have their voices heard, but also to get their own candidates
to become members of the board.256  This allows UK activists to use a
less hostile approach than is used by activists in the United States.257
The activists do not “start a relationship with a lecture” or look for
proxy fights; instead, the activists use a friendlier approach, in which
they present their ideas with “solid arguments and solid facts.”258
They are able to work openly and patiently with shareholders in order
to gain their support.259  Therefore, instead of using the “Wall Street
Rule” that is used by many American shareholders, UK shareholders
are able to simply speak with board members when they do not like
what the corporation is doing.260  To illustrate, when activists send let-
251. Roger Barker, Pfizer’s Pitch for AstraZeneca Reveals British Protectionism in a Global
World, CNN (May 13, 2014, 6:27 AM), http://www.cnn.com/2014/05/13/business/pfizer-astrazene
ca-roger-barker/.
252. Id. (describing how the board is made up of shareholders).
253. Under the Code, “directors are explicitly required to deliver success over the long-term.”
Id.
254. Id.; see also Ben Hirschler & Bill Berkrot, Pfizer Walks Away from $118 Billion As-
traZeneca Takeover Fight, REUTERS (May 26, 2014 11:55 AM), http://www.reuters.com/article/
2014/05/26/us-astrazeneca-pfizer-idUSBREA3R0H520140526#pUSVPR7oqkzZc8Kl.97 (“Black-
Rock, AstraZeneca’s biggest shareholder, backed the board’s rejection of Pfizer’s 55 pounds a
share offer.”).
255. Tafara, supra note 95 (“Although the board may have a comparative advantage in mak- R
ing ordinary business decisions, the board has no advantage over the shareholders when it comes
to deciding whether or not to sell the company to a bidder. That decision is simply a variation of
the decision whether to buy or sell shares in the first place.”).
256. Jen Wieczner, Meet Europe’s Best Activist Investor: Cevian’s Christer Gardell, FORTUNE
(Aug. 27, 2015, 11:00 AM), http://fortune.com/2015/08/27/christer-gardell-activist-investor-eu-
rope/.
257. Id.
258. Id.; see also Samuel, supra note 153.  According to Steven Brown, the chief executive of R
GO Investment Partners, “In Europe, you don’t have to shout to get anywhere . . . .  We ap-
proach companies and boards privately with a view to changing strategy.” Id.
259. Activism: 10 Key Differences, supra note 141. R
260. Alison Smith, Activist Investors Can Find the UK a Tricky Destination, FIN. TIMES (Dec.
18, 2013, 7:59 PM), http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/96fd7292-67fb-11e3-8ada-00144feabdc0.html#
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ters to corporations in an attempt to discuss possible changes, UK cor-
porations will generally answer the letters and seek the activists’
opinions.261  U.S. corporations, on the other hand, are much less re-
sponsive.262  Activists abroad “have no problem at all in meeting man-
agement or chairmen or non-executive directors of any listed
company in the UK.”263  Meanwhile, due to its lack of shareholder-
friendly laws, the U.S. continues to be one of the most difficult envi-
ronments to work in.264  The positive UK results, however, could be
mimicked for U.S. investors if the applicable sections of the UK
Codes were to be implemented in the United States.  The following
Sections discuss how this could be done.
2. A Merged Governance System
The current corporate governance law in the United States stands
out among the governance systems of other countries because of its
restrictions on shareholders.265  Not all people, however, see this as a
bad thing.  For example, Jack Welch, the former chief executive officer
of General Electric, believes that “shareholder value is the dumbest
idea in the world.”266  From his position, corporations need to stop
focusing on shareholder value, and begin focusing on other aspects of
the corporation, such as creating jobs, building factories, and produc-
ing a good work product.267  However, this viewpoint overlooks the
fact that when corporations place an emphasis on shareholder value,
corporations function better overall.268  Unfortunately, shareholder
axzz3sjHmd9s9; see also Jonathan Marino & Matt Turner, Activist Investors Keep Colliding –
And It’s Forcing the Industry to Transform, BUS. INSIDER (Sep. 12, 2015, 12:55 AM), http://www
.businessinsider.com/wall-streets-activist-investors-are-heading-overseas-2015-9 (“Activists are
much more likely to operate behind the scenes outside the US, exhorting company management
to change strategy in private.”).
261. Gretchen Morgenson, Belated Apologies in Proxy Land, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 20, 2006),
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/08/20/business/yourmoney/20gret.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0.
262. Id.
263. BOB WEARING & YUVAL MILLO, CTR. BUS. PERFORMANCE, ACTIVIST INVESTORS IN UK
QUOTED COMPANIES AND THE IMPLICATIONS FOR CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 21 (2011), https://
www.icaew.com/~/media/corporate/files/technical/corporate%20governance/uk%20corporate%
20governance/tecpln10783%20activist%20investor%20report%20final%20reduced.ashx.
264. Morgenson, supra note 261. R
265. Bebchuk, The Case for Increasing Shareholder Power, supra note 123, at 848. R
266. Francesco Guerera, Welch Denounces Corporate Obsessions, FIN. TIMES (Mar. 13, 2009,
2:00 AM), http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/3ca8ec2e-0f70-11de-ba10-0000779fd2ac.html#axzz4FuNnx
Hht.
267. Andre Spicer, Why Shareholder Value Is the ‘Dumbest Idea in the World, CNN (Jan. 24,
2014, 6:36 AM), http://www.cnn.com/2014/01/24/business/davos-shareholder-value-is-dumbest-
idea/index.html.
268. See Justin Fox & Jay W. Lorsch, What Good Are Shareholders?, HARV. BUS. REV., July-
Aug. 2012, at 48, 50.
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value continues to be overlooked.269  This is due, in part, to sharehold-
ers having minimal decision-making powers and corporate managers
focusing on their own profits instead of shareholder value, in addition
to the waves of scandal that seemingly plague corporate America.270
Therefore, outside investors, such as activist shareholders, are needed
to ensure the proper functioning of American corporations.271  In fact,
when investors such as activist shareholders hold more than five per-
cent of outstanding shares in a corporation, the corporation is better
governed, the executive pay is more reasonable, and the corporation
as a whole outperforms its competitors.272
For that reason, the United States should adopt a “hybrid govern-
ance regime” that will give shareholders a greater voice.273  According
to Anita Anand, “[A]n enabling governance regime coupled with
mandatory disclosure of a firm’s governance practices is likely to yield
a high level of compliance at lower costs than a wholly mandatory
regime.”274  By retaining the mandatory disclosure laws that are al-
ready in place in the U.S., investors will have the information that
they feel is necessary for them to make accurate investment deci-
sions.275  The “comply or explain” provisions of the UK Codes would
work alongside these rules to accommodate and promote innovative
shareholder ideas as shareholders and all sectors of the corporation
would be operating together to maximize value.276
The changes that activist investors make promote more effective
governance inside of the corporation, which in turn leads to the en-
hancement of shareholder value.277  It is a domino effect that is trig-
269. Id.
270. Id.
271. Id. at 56.
272. Id. at 55.
273. Anand, supra note 110, at 232. R
274. Id. at 230.
275. Id. at 248–49 (“The disclosure enables investors to react to governance choices on the
basis of full information.”).
276. INST. OF CHARTERED ACCOUNTANTS IN ENGLAND AND WALES, WHEN IS COMPLY OR
EXPLAIN THE RIGHT APPROACH?, http://www.icaew.com/-/media/corporate/files/technical/cor-
porate-governance/dialogue-in-corporate-governance/icaew-tl-q3-web.ashx?la=en (“This is par-
ticularly important in a complex area like corporate governance: it is about human behaviour,
interaction and decision making which are most effective when companies act out of their own
will, rather than being forced to change through structures and procedures.”).
277. Lisa M. Fairfax, Shareholder Democracy on Trial: International Perspective on the Effec-
tiveness of Increased Shareholder Power, 3 VA. L. & BUS. REV. 1, 3 (2008) (“Professor Lucian
Bebchuk notably argues that increasing shareholder democracy would improve corporate gov-
ernance and enhance managerial accountability.  Indeed, Bebchuk and others contend that aug-
menting shareholder power will make directors and officers more accountable to shareholders,
thereby curbing abuses of authority and the incidence of misconduct.  In Bebchuk’s view, in-
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gered by the activists.278  However, if U.S. activists do not have the
adequate tools to make these essential changes, the dominos cannot
fall into their rightful place and shareholders will not be able to maxi-
mize their profits.279  UK shareholders are given the authority to de-
cide what corporate governance measures are necessary and what is
appropriate to protect their interests, so they have a better chance of
seeing the changes that they want.280  This idea should be incorpo-
rated in the United States.
C. But How Can a Merged Governance System Be Imposed?
The convergence of various international corporate governance sys-
tems has been the subject of debate over the last decade, making the
possibility of a U.S. and UK merged governance system a true possi-
bility.281  Opponents of conversion argue that governance systems and
corporations’ objectives “tend to reflect the institutional and historical
differences in legal, political, social and cultural systems.”282  While
this is true, the divergence of cultures is not problematic in this case,
as the U.S. and UK are very similar in many respects.  In fact, the UK
and the U.S. are deemed to have a “special relationship” due to their
similar political, diplomatic, cultural, economic, and historical rela-
tions.283  However, the markets of the two countries are different.284
This is why the entirety of the UK governance system cannot override
the current U.S. corporate governance system.  While this is true,
there is no reason that small portions of the UK Codes cannot be
merged with U.S. law to create the best possible arrangement for ac-
tivist shareholders.
creased shareholder democracy should translate into improved shareholder value.” (footnotes
omitted)).
278. Id.
279. James McConvill, How Large Companies Can Make Shareholders Happy, AGE (Dec. 22,
2005), http://www.theage.com.au/news/business/how-large-companies-can-make-shareholders-
happy/2005/12/21/1135032080136.html (“[P]roponents of shareholder empowerment view share-
holder governance rights as being a means to an end, rather than an end in itself.  The ‘end’
which connects both proponents and opponents in their analysis is maximizing company per-
formance—making the company as healthy as possible in governance terms to achieve more
profits.”).
280. See FIN. REPORTING COUNCIL, THE UK APPROACH, supra note 113, at 3; see also UK R
CORP. GOVERNANCE CODE 4 (FIN. REPORTING COUNCIL 2014).
281. Brian Ikol Adungo, An Analysis of the View that the Corporate Governance Systems
Wordwide Are Inevitably Converging Towards a Model Based on Shareholder Primacy and Dis-
persed Ownership Structure § 1 (May 2, 2012) (unpublished manuscript), http://papers.ssrn.com/
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2049764.
282. Id. § 4.
283. See Winston Churchill, Iron Curtain Speech at Westminster College (Mar. 5, 1946).
284. See supra notes 230–34 and accompanying text. R
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While the creation of a merged legal system would be a timely pro-
cess controlled by legislative action, the process can begin immedi-
ately with the reform of governance practices within corporations.285
Beginning immediately, U.S. corporations can include the applicable
shareholder protection provisions in their articles of incorporation on
a “comply or explain” basis, thus creating structural and shareholder-
oriented changes within the corporation.286  The provisions could be
tailored to the specific corporations, and thus would be more effective
than a “comply or else” approach that is present and must be followed
by all corporations in the United States today.287  As a comply or ex-
plain approach, the corporation would be able to deviate from the
provisions as long as it was in the best interest of the shareholders.288
If the corporation did find it necessary to deviate, it would be required
to release a public statement explaining the deviation.289  In order for
this to work properly, the activist shareholders and normal sharehold-
ers would need to work together to monitor the corporations and en-
sure that the deviation was, in fact, in the best interest of the
shareholders.290  Assuming that the corporations would either comply
or choose to make other shareholder beneficial decisions, the ap-
proach would undoubtedly be a success.
The success of corporations that implement the shareholder friendly
governance practices would then increase the odds of creating a true
legally merged system.291  This is because the shareholders that bene-
fit will “create an interest group to press for reforming corporate gov-
ernance to encourage value-enhancing practices.”292  In other words,
after gaining benefits within corporations with altered corporate gov-
ernance policies, shareholders will undoubtedly come together to
press for gradual changes that will mimic the changes already imple-
mented within the complying corporations.293
When the time comes for the shareholders to push for a legal con-
vergence, the argument for reform should be modeled on the Brazil-
285. Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The End of History for Corporate Law 1, 17
(Yale Law Sch., Working Paper No. 235, 2000), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_
id=204528.
286. Id. at 2–3.
287. Subrata Sarkar, The Comply-Or-Explain Approach for Enforcing Governance Norms
1–2 (Indira Gandhi Inst. of Dev. Research, Working Paper No. WP-2015-022, 2015), http://www
.igidr.ac.in/pdf/publication/WP-2015-022.pdf.
288. Id. at 4.
289. Id. at 6–8.
290. Id.
291. Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 285, at 17, 25–26. R
292. Id. at 25–26.
293. Id. at 18.
\\jciprod01\productn\D\DPL\66-2\DPL206.txt unknown Seq: 35  8-JUN-17 13:06
2017] SHAREHOLDERS’ MIGRATION TO EUROPE 639
ian Stock Exchange reform of 2000.294  There, in order to better
protect investors while also aiming to increase the capital market’s
value, Brazil implemented a “dual regulatory regime,” in which corpo-
rations were allowed to choose from four levels of listing require-
ments with shareholder protection increasing at each level.295  The
system allowed each corporation to choose the requirement that best
fit its needs while still protecting shareholders at each level and at-
tracting new sources of capital.296  Although a system such as this can-
not be put into place over night, it is the best way to ensure that
corporate America is the greatest that it can be, as corporations could
choose from a varying degree of shareholder friendly policies in order
to suit the needs of their business.  By slowly transitioning to a merged
corporate governance system, average shareholders and activist share-
holders would be given more power and be better able to communi-
cate with corporations to generate changes to improve all involved
parties.  The next Part discusses how each party would benefit from
these changes in the corporate governance system.
IV. IMPACT
Corporate governance is at the center of some of the country’s most
important issues.297  It affects the creation and distribution of wealth,
it influences social mobility, stability, and fluidity, as well as social se-
curity and retirement plans.298  In other words, corporate governance
laws touch on most of the issues that activist shareholders seek to
change.299  For that reason, U.S. shareholders, including those that are
activists, must be well informed because “[a]n informed shareholder is
the best visionary, planner and evaluator an organization can count
on.”300  Offering feedback on proposed ideas, discussing new strate-
gies, and providing insight into the day-to-day management opera-
tions will ensure shareholder involvement.301  If the American
activists are better informed due to the implementation of the applica-
294. Aguilera et al., supra note 109, at 28. R
295. Id.
296. Id.
297. GOUREVITCH & SHINN, supra note 71, at 3. R
298. See id.
299. Activists push for changes in company’s leadership and business practices. See Steven-
son, supra note 7. R
300. Nitin Mamillapally, Shareholders or Stakeholders – Who Is More Important?, LINKEDIN
(Jun. 19, 2014), https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/20140619213822-24445561-shareholders-or-
stakeholders-who-is-more-important.
301. Id.
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ble sections of the UK Codes, they will be able to generate great
changes that benefit both shareholders and corporations at large.
This can be accomplished effectively through a “hybrid governance
regime.”302  By combining the UK shareholder-friendly policies with
the strict, mandatory regulation schemes already in place in the
United States, activists would be able to work hand-in-hand with
shareholders more easily.  In doing so, activists would then be able to
generate changes that benefit shareholders and the corporations in
which they invest.303  With this power, activists will no longer need to
look abroad for business opportunities, as they will have all of the
necessary tools to enact change in their home country.304  By working
within a merged, hybrid corporate governance system, activist share-
holders would be better suited to ensure that shareholder value would
be of great importance within corporations.  However, not only share-
holders would benefit under this regime, because corporations would
excel alongside of their shareholders.305  This notion is further dis-
cussed in the following Sections.
A. Shareholders Will Reap More Benefits
When activists buy shares in a corporation, they seek to make
changes in management and in the boardroom that benefit all share-
holders.306  Activists have the ability to make changes that will move a
company in a new direction as long as the company’s other sharehold-
ers agree that the changes are desirable and beneficial.307  When
shareholders’ voices are restricted, this is a difficult task.  However, by
302. Anand, supra note 110, at 232. R
303. Bebchuk, The Case for Increasing Shareholder Power, supra note 123, at 842–43 (“I do R
not view increasing shareholder power as an end in and of itself.  Rather, effective corporate
governance, which enhances shareholder and firm value, is the objective underlying my analysis.
From this perspective, increased shareholder power would be desirable only if it would operate
to improve corporate performance and value.”).
304. Aguilera et al., supra note 109, at 2 (“Effective corporate governance entails mechanisms R
to ensure executives respect the rights and interests of company stakeholders, as well as guaran-
tee that stakeholders act responsibly with regard to the generation, protection, and distribution
of wealth invested in the firm.”).
305. Matt Krantz, Activist Investors Often Cause More Good than Harm, USA TODAY (May
3, 2016, 8:30 AM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/money/markets/2016/05/03/activist-investors-
often-cause-more-good-than-harm/83841952/ (“Activists, and companies that adopt activist
thinking, often focus on improving their return on invested capital.  This is a financial measure
that tells you how much profit is driven out of the money entrusted to the company by
investors.”).
306. Bret Kenwell, Nelson Peltz – Activist Investors Benefit All Shareholders, THESTREET
(Apr. 2, 2015, 3:23 PM), https://www.thestreet.com/story/13100807/1/nelson-peltz—activist-inves-
tors-benefit-all-shareholders.html.
307. Bebchuk & Jackson, supra note 183, at 50. R
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allowing activists to work closely with other shareholders, activists’
success rates in altering the corporation’s governance structure and
increasing shareholder wealth would soar.308  By working together, ac-
tivists and shareholders would be better able to address governance
flaws more successfully.309  This would cause directors and officers to
be more accountable to shareholders, thus allowing for an increase in
shareholder benefits.310
In a time where companies are holding more cash on their balance
sheets than ever before, activists are fighting for corporations to give
the money back to shareholders through dividend payments and share
buybacks.311  For this reason, activists are considered “rock stars” who
are both advocates and “watchdogs” for all shareholders.312  In 2013,
for example, activists returned eighteen percent back to shareholders,
compared to the average nine percent seen throughout the rest of the
corporate market.313  This percentage of return can grow even larger
if the U.S. is exposed to a merged corporate governance system.  Ac-
tivists abroad have been extremely successful in positively influencing
share values through corporate governance practices that increase
shareholder participation.314  By creating a hybrid governance system,
the United States could adopt the same ideals and thereby create the
same effects, further enhancing the U.S. capital market as a whole.
B. More Change Leads to More Value for Corporate America
Ensuring shareholders’ satisfaction by giving them greater power is
important, but it is the not the “end game.”315  Shareholders will un-
doubtedly receive better benefits with more help from shareholder ac-
tivists,316 but the value of the targeted firms will also increase as
308. Michael P. Smith, Shareholder Activism by Institutional Investors: Evidence from
CalPERS, 51 J. FIN. 227, 251 (1996) (“[E]vidence indicates that shareholder activism is largely
successful in changing governance structure and, when successful, results in a statistically signifi-
cant increase in shareholder wealth.”).
309. Bebchuk, The Case for Increasing Shareholder Power, supra note 123, at 913. R
310. Fairfax, supra note 277, at 3. R
311. Rana Foroohar, Shareholder ‘Activists’ – Are They Good Or Bad?, TIME (Mar. 26, 2014),
http://time.com/38487/shareholder-activists-are-they-good-or-bad/.  Apple, for example, had a
cash hoard of nearly $200 billion in 2015.  Sarah Whitten, Just How Much Cash Does Apple
Have?, CNBC (Oct. 28, 2015, 10:16 AM), http://www.cnbc.com/2015/10/28/just-how-much-cash-
does-apple-have.html.
312. Nathan Vardi, The Golden Age of Activist Investing, FORBES (Aug. 6, 2013, 8:25 AM),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/nathanvardi/2013/08/06/the-golden-age-of-activist-investing/.
313. Stevenson, surpa note 7. R
314. Fairfax, supra note 277, at 3. R
315. Bebchuk, The Case for Increasing Shareholder Power, supra note 123, at 842–43. R
316. See supra notes 306–14 and accompanying text. R
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well.317  Prior to 1994, most evidence showed that activist shareholders
had a minimal effect on overall firm performance; however, recent
studies find that shareholders and activists, when working together,
are associated with a positive long-term effect in corporations.318  In
fact, “proposals sponsored by blockholders have a large measured ef-
fect on nearly all aspects of firm performance.”319
While the benefits created by activists are prevalent in the United
States already, they may cease to exist if activists continue to move
abroad.  The addition of the shareholder friendly UK policies will
keep activists in the U.S. and will lead to even more beneficial
changes in corporate America.  In the UK, direct communication be-
tween shareholders and management is very common, causing compa-
nies to open themselves up to activist shareholder engagement.320
The added UK policies would allow for the communication lines to
not only open between activists and other shareholders, but also be-
tween activists and U.S. corporations’ management.  American activ-
ists would then be able to successfully use a “suggestivist” approach
when attempting to enact changes.321  Instead of launching aggressive
campaigns and potentially embarrassing the CEOs of corporations,
activists would act as “suggestivists” by cordially discussing their plans
with corporations’ management.322  Activist engagement occurs in the
UK by using this approach to influence corporations rather than using
legal threats and confrontational practices.323  By following this tactic,
U.S. activists can work hand-in-hand with shareholders and the com-
panies’ boards alike to affect changes.
A study conducted at the London Business School found a “high
correlation between enhanced firm value and shareholder activ-
ism.”324  The authors noted that the correlation between value and
317. Bebchuk, The Case for Increasing Shareholder Power, supra note 123, at 842–43. R
318. Bonnie G. Buchanan et al., Shareholder Proposal Rules and Practice: Evidence from a
Comparison of the United States and the United Kingdom, 49 AM. BUS. L.J. 739, 746 (2012)
(“[I]mprovement is greater when shareholder proposals are sponsored by blockholders.”).
319. Id. at 788.
320. John Hendry et al., Responsible Ownership, Shareholder Value and the New Shareholder
Activism 1, 8 (Univ. of Cambridge ESRC Ctr. for Bus. Research, Working Paper No. 297, 2004),
http://www.cbr.cam.ac.uk/fileadmin/user_upload/centre-for-business-research/downloads/work-
ing-papers/wp297.pdf.
321. Vardi, The Golden Age of Activist Investing, supra note 312. R
322. Id.
323. Kate Burgess, Confrontational Activism Rare in the UK, FIN. TIMES (Jan. 3, 2016, 2:23
PM), http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/d39997a0-a3f2-11e5-8218-6b8ff73aae15.html#axzz3zVkXp
Cw8.
324. Fairfax, supra note 277, at 25. See generally Marco Becht et al., Returns to Shareholder R
Activism: Evidence from a Clinical Study of the Hermes UK Focus Fund, 22 REV. FIN. STUD.
3094 (2009).
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activism is not as prevalent in the United States because of the poor
current governance mechanisms currently set in place.325  However,
reforming the U.S. governance system to incorporate the UK policies
that are more favorable for activism will increase the chance that ac-
tivism will have an even greater positive impact on targeted
corporations.326
Opponents have continuously overlooked the evidence that share-
holder activism can, and does, improve target companies’ opera-
tions.327  Opponents are greatly concerned with the activist’s push for
higher dividend payments, arguing that the higher payment could
leave a corporation with fewer resources for future investments.328
However, “opponents . . . overlook that reducing cash holdings and
investments might actually move companies closer to, rather than
away from, the levels that are optimal for the long term.”329  When a
company issues a dividend payment that is higher than expected, the
company’s stock prices increase as investors become interested that
the company is perhaps growing.330  Although issuing dividend pay-
ments means that money is leaving a corporation, the payments at-
tract more investors.331  This essentially allows the company to earn
back what it has lost through new investors.332  When looking at the
impact in such a way, it is clear that increasing dividend payments also
increases firm value.333
In looking beyond the effects of dividend payments, several com-
mentators published a study that documented a positive seven percent
stock return after filing a disclosure statement that an activist was in-
vesting in a company.334  Although disclosure laws have at times
325. Becht et al., supra note 324, at 3094. R
326. Id.
327. Jonathan M. Karpoff, The Impact of Shareholder Activism on Target Companies: A Sur-
vey of Empirical Findings 4 (Aug. 18, 2001) (unpublished manuscript), http://papers.ssrn.com/
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=885365.
328. Bebchuk et al., The Long-Term Effects, supra note 29, at 1136. R
329. Id.
330. How Dividends Affect Stock Price, SCOTTRADE (Jul. 1, 2014), https://about.scottrade
.com/blog/blogposts/How-Dividends-Affect-Stock-Price.html.
331. Id.
332. Id.; Claire Boyte-White, How Dividends Affect Stock Prices, INVESTOPEDIA (Sept. 10,
2015, 11:15 AM), http://www.investopedia.com/articles/investing/091015/how-dividends-affect-
stock-prices.asp (“When companies display consistent dividend histories, they become more at-
tractive to investors.  As more investors buy in to take advantage of this benefit of stock owner-
ship, the stock price naturally increases, thereby reinforcing the belief that the stock is strong.  If
a company announces a higher-than-normal dividend, public sentiment tends to soar.”).
333. Fairfax, supra note 277, at 3. R
334. Alon Brav et al., Hedge Fund Activism, Corporate Governance, and Firm Performance,
63 J. FIN. 1729 (2008).
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harmed activist campaigns, this suggests that shareholders, as well as
potential future shareholders, believe that activist campaigns create
value in their target companies.335  These shareholders are correct, as
“target firms experience increases in payout, operating performance,
and higher CEO turnover after activism.”336  These benefits are not
short term, as some suggest, as in the five-year period after the activist
intervention the gains continue to exist.337
Because shareholders directly affect the “health and efficient func-
tioning of U.S. capital markets,” it is problematic that U.S. sharehold-
ers have fewer rights than most other foreign shareholders.338  While
the benefits that corporate America has already experienced due to
activist campaigns is significant, even larger and more important bene-
fits can be achieved if the U.S. creates a merged corporate governance
system.  However, if more rights are not given to shareholders and the
investors who fight for them, it is likely that activists will continue to
launch more campaigns abroad, eventually leaving the American mar-
kets behind completely.  In order to avoid their departure, it is vital to
remember the benefits that activists bring forth and make changes to
the corporate governance system accordingly.
V. CONCLUSION
While the UK corporate governance system as a whole would not
be an adequate fit in the United States,339 the United States should
incorporate a subset of its policies into its own corporate governance
system.  By implementing the fifth and sixth principles of the UK
Stewardship Code, as well at Section E.1 and E.2 of the UK Corpo-
rate Governance Code, into the current U.S. regulatory scheme, ac-
tivist shareholders will have access to all of the tools in which they
need to generate beneficial changes.  The merged governance system
will allow activists to work closely with corporations’ shareholders and
board members in order to enhance both the shareholders’ and corpo-
rations’ values.  Carl Icahn was able to raise Apple’s market value by
$18 billion using less than a mere 280 characters in a country that has
proven to be shareholder unfriendly.  With a merged corporate gov-
ernance system created from the finest UK and U.S. governance poli-
335. Id.
336. Id.
337. John Carney, Welcome to the Golden Age of Activist Investors, CNBC (Aug. 14, 2013,
3:37 PM), http://www.cnbc.com/id/100963166.
338. COMM. ON CAPITAL MKT. REGULATION, INTERIM REPORT 1, 16 (2006), http://www
.capmktsreg.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/08/Committees-November-2006-Interim-Report.pdf.
339. See generally Ashar Qureshi, Rights Issues: Why US Shareholders Are Not Always Wel-
come 22 INT’L FIN. L. REV. 37 (2003).
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cies, Icahn and other activist investors will be able to bring forth even
more beneficial changes in corporate America.  That possibility
should excite shareholders and corporations alike.
Julia Potts*
* J.D. Candidate, DePaul University College of Law, 2017.
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